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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION IN PRIVACY LAW

LAUREN HENRY SCHOLZ*
ABSTRACT
Many privacy advocates assume that the key to providing individuals with more privacy protection is strengthening the government’s
power to directly sanction actors that hurt the privacy interests of
citizens. This Article contests the conventional wisdom, arguing that
private rights of action are essential for privacy regulation. First, I
show how private rights of action make privacy law regimes more
effective in general. Private rights of action are the most direct regulatory access point to the private sphere. They leverage private
expertise and knowledge, create accountability through discovery,
and have expressive value in creating privacy-protective norms. Then
to illustrate the general principle, I provide examples of how private
rights of action can improve privacy regulation in a suite of key
modern privacy problems. We cannot afford to leave private rights of
action out of privacy reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal privacy legislation in the United States is coming.1 This
will place the United States in step with the global zeitgeist. In the
past few years, many jurisdictions, including the European Union,
Brazil, China, Canada, and Australia, have passed comprehensive
privacy legislation.2 In 2018, California passed comprehensive
privacy legislation—which has been influential beyond the state’s
borders3—and ten more states are on track to pass privacy legislation this year.4 Increased enforcement of consumer privacy rights in
these jurisdictions has led industry to actively lobby Congress for
federal legislation on privacy, seeking simplification of the patchwork of laws with which potentially regulated companies must
comply.5 Industry is now on the same page as American consumer
advocates who have long advocated for a federal privacy law.6 There
is bipartisan political consensus around the need for federal privacy
1. Karen Schuler, Federal Data Privacy Regulation Is on the Way—That’s a Good Thing,
IAPP (Jan. 22, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/federal-data-privacy-regulation-is-on-the-waythats-a-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/GJV9-M5XT].
2. See Global Comprehensive Privacy Law Mapping Chart, IAPP, https://iapp.org/media/
pdf/resource_center/global_comprehensive_privacy_law_mapping.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C9SCBCL].
3. Brandon P. Reilly & Scott T. Lashway, The California Privacy Rights Act Has Passed:
What’s in It?, MANATT (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/clientalert/the-california-privacy-rights-act-has-passed [https://perma.cc/C6X2-P2FG].
4. Ruth Reader, These States Are on Track to Pass Data Privacy Laws this Year, FAST CO.
(Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.fastcompany.com/90606571/state-data-privacy-laws-2021 [https://
perma.cc/TYF9-MRBU] (describing content and status of legislation recently passed or set to
pass in Nevada, Vermont, Maine, Virginia, New York, Washington, Utah, and Oklahoma, and
noting that Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Connecticut, and Kentucky all have bills on the docket
that follow a similar format to California’s California Consumer Privacy Act).
5. Business Roundtable CEOs Call on Congress to Pass Comprehensive, Nationwide
Consumer Data Privacy Law, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.business
roundtable.org/business-roundtable-ceos-call-on-congress-to-pass-comprehensive-nationwideconsumer-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/8PT3-TZBY]; David Meyer, In the Wake of
GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data Privacy?, FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018, 6:30 AM),
https://fortune.com/2018/11/29/federal-data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/6AA6-K5SW].
6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-52, INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AUTHORITY COULD ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY 15-19
(2019) (interviewing many privacy experts who advocate for the need for federal legislation
on privacy); see also Alexandria J. Saquella, Comment, Personal Data Vulnerability: Constitutional Issues with the California Consumer Privacy Act, 60 JURIMETRICS 215, 231-32
(2020).
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legislation, with politicians of both parties concerned about abuse
of power by Big Tech.7
There is a great deal of consensus around the ground a federal
privacy law should cover.8 Companies are amenable to an understanding that notice and choice are insufficient to delineate privacy
rights in an interconnected world and even that fiduciary duties
may exist between firms and consumers with respect to personal
information.9 But two principal fault lines are holding up legislative
action: preemption and private right of action.10 In privacy law,
there is extensive scholarly debate on the question of preemption.11
By contrast, there is scant discussion of the need for expanding the
ability of private actors to enforce privacy protections.12
7. Schuler, supra note 1.
8. Elizabeth R. Pike, Defending Data: Toward Ethical Protections and Comprehensive
Data Governance, 69 EMORY L.J. 687, 720 (2020).
9. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, The New Privacy Law, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE
19 (2021) (describing the evolution in corporate rhetoric about their privacy obligations from
lassiez-faire ideology, which saw a need for only minimal notice and choice obligation at most,
to today’s neoliberal rhetoric, which contends internal corporate compliance structures can
protect privacy).
10. See Fara Soubouti, Note, Data Privacy and the Financial Services Industry: A Federal
Approach to Consumer Protection, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 527, 547-48 (2020); Peter Swire, US
Federal Privacy Preemption Part 1: History of Federal Preemption of Stricter State Laws, IAPP
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/us-federal-privacy-preemption-part-1-history-of-federalpreemption-of-stricter-state-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9QJE-AEP9].
11. Swire, supra note 10; Peter Swire, US Federal Privacy Preemption Part 2: Examining
Preemption Proposals, IAPP (Jan. 10, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/us-federal-privacypreemption-part-2-examining-preemption-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/9BWE-B8FC] (outlining
the basic terms of the preemption debate and evaluating legislative proposals). The conversation about the trade-off between allowing legislative innovation to proceed in the states
and providing certainty to industry predates the current moment. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz,
Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904-06 (2009).
12. See Soubouti, supra note 10, at 547 (“While some states provide consumers with a
private right of action, most notably the [California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018], none of
the current federal legislative proposals offer this source of accountability to allow consumers
to take companies to court for federal privacy law violations.” (footnote omitted)). A handful
of scholars have highlighted the role of private rights of action, and they also often note the
dearth of scholarship on the topic. See, e.g., Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy
for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1893, 1929-32 (2019); Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE
L.J. F. 614, 619-22 (2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1805, 1850-52 (2010); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 283, 29293 (2007) [hereinafter Citron, Reservoirs of Danger]; Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data
Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 144-46 (2006).
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For example, Florida appeared to be on the verge of passing an
ambitious and effective state privacy law, but disagreement over a
private right of action stymied the bill. The Florida House passed a
privacy bill that would have provided citizens with a set of substantive privacy rights, authorized the attorney general to police violations, and granted Florida citizens a private right of action.13 With
the support of Governor Ron DeSantis, the bill passed the Florida
House almost unanimously, 118-1.14 Many House members were
eager to provide Floridians with protections against a technology
sector they saw as exploitative and overreaching.15 Due to industry
pressure, the House privacy bill died in the Senate. Instead, the
Florida Senate passed a similar privacy bill sans private right of
action.16 The House refused to pass the Senate version of the bill,
and the legislation died.17 As one industry commentator observed:
“the Florida bill died because the House and Senate could not align
on a private right of action—in other words, an individual’s ability
to sue a company for privacy damages. The Senate’s version of the
Even when private law approaches come up, they are usually as an afterthought. See, e.g.,
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 669-70 (2019) (“To be
clear, this Article primarily addresses the companies’ relationships to governments. It does
not focus on the many significant issues surrounding technology companies’ relationships with
their users in general, though as the Conclusion highlights, the rise of Digital Switzerlands
may have implications for company-user dynamics as well.” (footnote omitted)). This mentality is far from unique to privacy scholarship. As Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman
observed, “[a] well-ingrained notion in liberal-egalitarian thought is that the state’s responsibility to ensure fair equality of opportunity is sufficient for realizing substantive equality
and freedom.” Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1395, 1402 (2016).
13. Susan Grant & Caitriona Fitzgerald, Florida's Privacy Bill Needs Teeth Back or It’s
‘Protections’ Are Meaningless, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Apr. 23, 2021, 6:30 AM),
https://www.tallahassee.com/story/opinion/2021/04/23/florida-senate-must-put-private-rightaction-back-privacy-bill/7323010002/ [https://perma.cc/L3CE-V3JR]; News Service of Florida,
Florida Gov. DeSantis Continues Targeting Big Tech, Pushes Data Privacy Legislation,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Feb. 16, 2021, 6:01 AM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/
2021/02/16/florida-gov-desantis-continues-targeting-big-tech-data-privacy-legislation-fionamcfarland-sprowls/6758908002/ [https://perma.cc/5RGH-4K4R].
14. Grant & Fitzgerald, supra note 13; News Service of Florida, supra note 13.
15. News Service of Florida, supra note 13; Benjamin Freed, Florida Privacy Bill Tanks
over Individuals’ Right to Sue, STATESCOOP (May 6, 2021), https://statescoop.com/floridaprivacy-bill-tanks-private-right-action/ [https://perma.cc/BW77-5MTY].
16. Grant & Fitzgerald, supra note 13.
17. Kendra Clark, Florida State Privacy Bill Squashed After Backlash from Local
Businesses, THE DRUM (May 4, 2021), https://www.thedrum.com/news/2021/05/04/floridastate-privacy-bill-squashed-after-backlash-local-businesses [https://perma.cc/77DK-FNNZ].
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bill removed the private right of action, and House members clearly
felt this left the law toothless.”18 At the time of this writing, the
debate is still ongoing.19 Debates like the one in Florida are
happening throughout the country,20 so it is critical to understand
what is at stake when privacy legislation includes—or omits—a
private right of action.
In providing a framework for understanding the role of private
enforcement in privacy regulation, this Article both fills an important gap in the legal literature and addresses a contemporary policy
question.21 Private rights of action have two important benefits for
privacy regulation.
First, private enforcement marshals the resources of the private
sector to fund and provide information in dealing with this ubiquitous issue. Private enforcement and public enforcement are complements not substitutes. Addressing modern privacy problems
requires productive redundancy—that is, providing legal avenues
for both government and private parties to observe and challenge
privacy-invasive practices.22 The hybrid approach has precedent in
regulatory areas such as employment, civil rights, and consumer
protection. The two avenues of enforcement reinforce each other.
18. Id.
19. Joseph Duball, Florida Privacy Bill Maintains PRA Ahead of House Floor Vote, IAPP
(Feb. 24, 2022), https://iapp.org/news/a/florida-privacy-bill-maintains-pra-ahead-of-housefloor-vote/ [https://perma.cc/29UX-P3GK].
20. Freed, supra note 15.
21. I follow other commentators in characterizing the system of rules for use of a
statutorily created private right of action as a “private enforcement regime.” E.g., Stephen B.
Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 637, 639 n.2 (2013) (“We use the phrase ‘private enforcement’ for both enforcement initiated by private parties but taken over by public officials as well as enforcement initiated and
prosecuted by private parties. We use the phrase ‘private enforcement regime’ to refer to the
system of rules that a legislature includes in its statutory design after deciding to include a
private right of action.”).
22. See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285,
318-20 (2016) (establishing redundant public-private enforcement as common in the regulatory status quo and suggesting it as a proper strategy for regulating important interests);
see also Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 2019 BYU L.
REV. 421, 424, 430 (“The multienforcer system provides accountability by allowing other
enforcers to step in to remedy lackluster enforcement resulting from problems of agency
capture, resource constraints, informational disadvantages, and political impediments....
When all enforcers focus their resources and efforts on large corporate targets, it deprives
enforcement resources from other targets that may cause more localized harm but lack the
deep-pockets to pay large fines or create splashy headlines.”).
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The modern American administrative state is not capable of addressing an issue of information privacy’s magnitude without
support from private enforcement.
Second, private rights of action have expressive value that cannot
be achieved through public regulation in the area of privacy.23 The
nature of the right implies that an individual opportunity to be
heard should be available. Privacy is a personal, dignitary right, so
there should be some avenue for an individual to personally contest
privacy violations. The ability to bring a claim is itself a recognition
of the dignity of the plaintiff.
Understanding the key contributions of private enforcement to
privacy regulation leads to several implications. First, because the
success of a private enforcement regime is based on its actual availability, neither enforcement support nor dignitary concerns will be
served by private rights of action that are in practice unavailable.
Any private enforcement avenue should address access to justice
concerns. Examples of provisions that increase the accessibility of
litigation include fee-shifting arrangements and elevated remedies.
Second, understanding what private enforcement contributes to
privacy regulation allows stakeholders to understand what limits on
private enforcement are possible without undermining the goals of
a private right of action. Limited private rights of action, such as a
right to explanation or a right to deletion, can relieve administrative
agencies of the burdens of addressing smaller matters and affirm individual dignity. Several statutes have limited their application to
larger companies, making sure the burden of enforcement falls on
the companies most able to fund the public good of litigation on the
topic. This is compatible with the aim of having a resilient private
partner for public regulators in enforcement. But it does run afoul
of the second function of private enforcement, which is to affirm the
dignity of citizens by allowing them access to civil recourse when it
comes to their personal right of privacy.
This last point reveals that the twin purposes of private enforcement that this Article has identified can be in tension. An individual
plaintiff vindicating her own rights may not always have the public
23. Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1153-60 (2012) (showing the essential role of private
enforcement through litigation in the functioning of the modern administrative state).
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interest in mind in how she chooses to resolve them. Private enforcement regimes tailored to provide support to public enforcement
of matters of public concern may not always provide direct claims
for relief for wronged citizens due to countervailing considerations.
Lawmakers must consider both purposes of private enforcement in
privacy regulation and balance accordingly between the two when
considering the scope of private rights of action. For example, the
dignitary interest may be more dominant for framing private
enforcement of sexual privacy intrusions, whereas providing regulatory resilience may be more significant for private enforcement of
anticompetitive data power claims.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I shows that a hybrid enforcement regime—a regulatory regime that has both private and
public enforcement avenues—is a more effective regime for privacy
enforcement than purely public enforcement. Part II argues that the
dignitary concerns implicated by privacy invasions independently
counsel for the availability of civil recourse via private enforcement.
Part III illustrates the critical role private rights of action can play
in five important privacy problems of the day.
I. COMPARING PRIVATE, PUBLIC, AND HYBRID ENFORCEMENT OF
PRIVACY LAW
Hybrid enforcement is needed for privacy regulation in the United
States. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is “the largest and
arguably the most important component of the U.S. privacy regulatory system.”24 Furthermore, Danielle Citron’s work shows that
state attorneys general also play a key role in enforcing privacy
law.25
These public enforcers play a critical role in privacy regulation
and should continue to do so. Yet private enforcement is necessary
to support public enforcement. Private enforcement deters potential
wrongdoers by allowing for a resilient avenue of enforcement,
available even when agency funding or political will is lacking. It
24. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 588 (2014).
25. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 748-51, 755-57 (2016).
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also broadens and democratizes the public forum for sharing and
analyzing disputes in the information economy beyond the limits of
administrative agencies. Matters brought to light by private enforcers, even if they are unsuccessful in their efforts, can aid public
enforcers in their regulatory choices.
Private rights of action have long been a prominent tool in
American regulation.26 Since the mid-twentieth century, there has
been increasing reliance on private rights of action to achieve
regulatory goals.27 As Sean Farhang put it, in lieu of a Europeanstyle regulatory state, the American system has a litigation state.28
Enthusiasm for private rights of action crosses ideological lines,
with conservatives and liberals alike seeking to use private
enforcement to shore up important rights.29 Regulation in substantive areas that include both private rights of action and public
enforcement have been dubbed “hybrid [enforcement] regimes.”30
These hybrid enforcement regimes exist in antitrust, securities, civil
rights, employment, and consumer protection, among others.31
There is expressive value to giving individuals the right to seek
relief from those that have wronged them that is not replicated in
public enforcement.32 Yet, even if one doubts that private enforcement offers unique benefits, it is apparent that the public enforcement system in the United States is reliant for its effectiveness
upon private enforcement systems in many areas of complex
regulation.33 Absent a rehaul of our public administrative systems,

26. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105,
111 (2008).
27. See Kit Barker, Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law, in PRIVATE LAW: KEY
ENCOUNTERS WITH PUBLIC LAW 3, 5-12 (Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen eds., 2013). Scholars
have posited several reasons behind this shift. Glover, supra note 23, at 1151-52 (describing
several possible explanations, including lack of public capacity, legislative desire to avoid
administrative burdens, and legislative desire to avoid blame for unpopular administrative
moves).
28. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
IN THE U.S. 214 (2010).
29. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, A New (Republican) Litigation State?, 11 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 657, 684, 686 (2021).
30. Clopton, supra note 22, at 292.
31. Id. at 295-98.
32. See discussion infra Part II.
33. See FARHANG, supra note 28, at 214-16.
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relying on public enforcement alone is unlikely to be as effective as
a hybrid regime.34
This Part will describe examples of public enforcement regimes
in privacy law, then private enforcement regimes, pointing out the
limitations of each. I will then show that the existing hybrid enforcement regimes in privacy regulation have proven more successful than regimes that choose just one avenue of enforcement, and
suggest that the benefits of hybrid regulation provide an explanation for their greater success.
A. Public Enforcement Regimes
Three examples of privacy regulations that are publicly enforced
are: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
and the FTC’s authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive” business
practices.35
HIPAA provides rules and regulations governing how medical
providers handle and process personal health information.36 It
creates civil and criminal penalties for wrongfully disclosing personal health information and authorizes the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate regulations to protect
health privacy.37 HHS and state attorneys general enforce the
statute and corresponding regulations.38 A recent empirical study of
HIPAA enforcement actions showed that “HHS and state attorneys
general focus their settlement and penalty efforts on cases involving
groups ... of patients and insureds,” and usually do not take action
on behalf of “individuals whose privacy and security rights have
34. See id. (crediting the success of Title VII to implementation through a private/public
law regime).
35. See Thorin Klosowski, The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the U.S. (and Why
It Matters), N.Y. TIMES: WIRECUTTER (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/
blog/state-of-privacy-laws-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/XFT8-75VZ].
36. Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA Privacy Rule with State Laws Regulating Ex
Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs’ Treating Physicians: A Guide to Performing HIPAA Preemption
Analysis, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1095-1105 (2006) (describing the HIPAA privacy rule).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (“General penalty for failure to comply with requirements and
standards”); id. § 1320d-6 (“Wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information”).
38. Id. § 1320d-6; Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010).
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been violated.”39 There is no private right of action under HIPAA’s
privacy rule for individuals whose health information is compromised.40
COPPA limits personal information gathering from children
under the age of thirteen on the internet.41 The statute directs the
FTC to issue and enforce regulations against noncomplying companies.42 The FTC provides guidance on protecting children’s
privacy.43 Only the FTC and state attorneys general may bring
enforcement actions against firms for COPPA violations.44 There is
no private right of action for children whose personal information
is compromised under COPPA regulations.45
The Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC to
regulate “unfair and deceptive acts or practices.”46 Unlike HIPAA
and COPPA, the FTC’s authority to regulate these business practices is general, not limited to a particular sector or class of
beneficiaries.47 A broad body of law has cropped up. However, because Congress granted this authority to the FTC, there is no
private right for individuals to sue for unfair and deceptive practices
under FTC guidance, precedent, and regulations.48
39. Stacey A. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1374-90 (2019).
40. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Every district court that has
considered this issue is in agreement that the statute does not support a private right of
action.”).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (defining the term “child” to mean “an individual under the age
of 13”); id. § 6501(10)(A) (stating that a “website ... directed to children” is “a commercial
website or online service that is targeted to children ... or ... [a] portion of a commercial
website or online service that is targeted to children”).
42. Id. § 6502(b)(1).
43. E.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for Your
Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/
childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-step-compliance [https://perma.cc/AP3D-7JW2]
[hereinafter FTC COPPA Compliance Plan].
44. See, e.g., Jesse M. Brody, Parents Sue TikTok for COPPA Violations, Settle for $1.1M,
MANATT (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/advertising-law/
parents-sue-tiktok-for-coppa-violations-settle [https://perma.cc/X4EA-VWWG].
45. See id. (explaining how, although there is no private right of action under COPPA,
plaintiffs have leveraged the FTC’s COPPA actions to gain settlements under common law
privacy tort theories).
46. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
47. Compare id. § 45, with 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, and FTC COPPA Compliance Plan, supra
note 43.
48. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement,
and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N app. B (May 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/
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Under these three public privacy laws, a government actor
discovers and takes action against private actors that violate
statutory or regulatory privacy rules.49 The FTC has been the
primary source of privacy regulation in the United States to date,50
with state attorneys general playing a significant supporting role.51
However, it also has significant limits. The FTC is a “norm entrepreneur,” not police; its goal is not to take action against every violator
of the rules, but to encourage every actor to improve their practices
in reference to a relatively small number of actions.52 Some commentators argue that this system, without modifications, encourages capture and laxity.53 Others suggest the penalties carried by
enforcement are simply too small.54 The FTC itself admits that it
needs more resources to adequately regulate privacy.55 HIPAA and
COPPA have had substantial problems adequately protecting health
and children’s privacy, respectively, and have been subject to
extensive critiques on their basic effectiveness.56 Both programs
about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/YN9A-VGW2]. Individual states
have common law actions against fraud and consumer protection statutes barring wrongful
behavior; individual plaintiffs may rely on FTC precedent as persuasive authority in such
actions but their claim does not have its source in the FTCA. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1204 (2021); Mason v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 792 P.2d 142, 149 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
49. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
50. Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2041, 2045-46 (2000).
51. Citron, supra note 25, at 748, 750, 811 (empirical study describing the role state
attorneys general play in privacy regulation).
52. See Hetcher, supra note 50, at 2045-46.
53. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959,
964 (2016) (addressing skeptics of the American model of regulation and encouraging
responsive regulation as a way to improve it).
54. See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 24, at 605-06.
55. Aaron Nicodemus, FTC Stumps for Additional Resources to Police Privacy, COMPLIANCE WK. (June 23, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.complianceweek.com/data-privacy/ftcstumps-for-additional-resources-to-police-privacy/29108.article [https://perma.cc/U88G-CGZ2].
56. E.g., Morgan Leigh Tendam, Note, The HIPAA-Pota-Mess: How HIPAA’s Weak Enforcement Standards Have Led States to Create Confusing Medical Privacy Remedies, 79 OHIO
ST. L.J. 411, 419-22 (2018) (arguing that HIPAA’s current enforcement scheme does not go far
enough to protect medical privacy or provide adequate remedies to victims of HIPAA
violations); Shannon H. Houser, Howard W. Houser & Richard M. Shewchuk, Assessing the
Effects of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Release of Patient Information by Healthcare Facilities,
4 PERSPS. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. 1, 1-5 (2007); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technology, Commerce,
Development, Identity, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 515, 541-48 (2007) (critiquing COPPA as
limited by “linear assumptions about development”); Anita L. Allen, Minor Distractions:
Children, Privacy and E-Commerce, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 751, 775 (2001) (“Privacy advocates are
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suffer from being limited in scope due to sector and age limitations,
and contain loopholes that enable actors in the industry to strategically evade coverage.57 For example, websites have been able to
avoid the COPPA privacy regulations by simply requiring each user
to claim they are over thirteen, without confirming the validity of
the user’s purported age.58
Public enforcement of privacy law simply has not proven expansive or resilient enough to create accountability and deter wrongful
practices.
B. Private Enforcement Regimes
Three examples of private enforcement regimes in privacy law
include the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA),59 state
common law privacy torts,60 and trade secret law.61
VPPA bars “video tape service provider[s] ... [from] knowingly
disclos[ing] ... personally identifiable information concerning any
consumer” to a third party.62 VPPA authorizes consumers to sue
when a video tape service provider discloses personal information.63
Despite the statute’s reference to video tapes, it can and has been
used by consumers to protect their privacy interest in protecting

not so sure about COPPA, despite the characterization of its passage as a consumer privacy
victory.”). But see Mark A. Rothstein, The End of the HIPAA Privacy Rule?, 44 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 352, 352 (2016) (“Ever since the ... [HIPAA] Privacy Rule took effect in 2003, it has
been one of the most misunderstood and disrespected of federal regulations.” (footnotes
omitted)).
57. Rothstein, supra note 56, at 352-53, 357.
58. Shannon Finnegan, Comment, How Facebook Beat the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act: A Look into the Continued Ineffectiveness of COPPA and How to Hold Social
Media Sites Accountable in the Future, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 828 (2020).
59. Video Privacy Protection Act, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. [hereinafter VPPA EPIC], https://
epic.org/privacy/vppa/ [https://perma.cc/HM87-5LM8].
60. See Solow-Niederman, supra note 12, at 619.
61. See R. Mark Halligan, Pre-Filing Investigation of a Trade Secret Misappropriation
Claim: The EONA Proofs, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2021, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/
legalindustry/pre-filing-investigation-trade-secret-misappropriation-claim-eona-proofs-202108-17/ [https://perma.cc/B6A9-UTSE] (noting that a plaintiff may bring suit under trade secret
law and “prevail in a trade secret misappropriation lawsuit ... [by] submit[ting] evidentiary
proof of existence, ownership, notice and access”).
62. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
63. See, e.g., VPPA EPIC, supra note 59.
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more modern forms of video consumption, such as streamed video
feeds.64
Most states have adopted the Second Restatement of Torts’
privacy law torts.65 These torts include intrusion upon seclusion,
appropriation of name or likeness, publicity given to private life,
and publicity placing a person in a false light.66 Each of these torts
has a series of elements and operates as a quasi-property right—
that is, they are rights to exclude from access or use of information
that spring from a specific relational context between parties.67
Trade secret law gives owners of trade secrets a claim against
those who wrongfully misappropriate protected information.68 The

64. See, e.g., Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 485, 489 (1st
Cir. 2016). But see Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that downloading and using free mobile application does not make a user a “subscriber,” therefore such a user cannot be a consumer under VPPA).
65. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1887, 1890 (2010) (“Courts readily embraced Prosser’s formulation of privacy tort law.
As the leading torts scholar of his time, Prosser was able to ensure that his interpretation of
the privacy torts became the dominant one. In addition to being the most well-regarded torts
scholar, Prosser was the leading treatise writer and casebook author. He was also the chief
reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts, in which he codified his scheme for tort privacy.
His influence encouraged courts and commentators to adopt his division of tort privacy into
the four causes of action of intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation. Even today,
most courts look to the Restatement’s formulation of the privacy torts as the primary
authority.”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. L. INST. 1977) (listing thirtyfive states and District of Columbia that have expressly adopted the Restatement privacy
torts).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (AM. L. INST. 1977).
67. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1115-17,
1132 (2016).
68. See, e.g., Robillard v. Opal Labs, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 3d 412, 451 (D. Or. 2019) (“To state
a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets [under the Oregon Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
plaintiff] must demonstrate that: (1) the subject of the claim qualifies as a statutory trade
secret; (2) [plaintiff] employed reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its trade
secrets; and (3) [defendant’s] conduct constitutes statutory misappropriation.”); WHIC LLC
v. NextGen Lab’ys, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1162 (D. Haw. 2018) (“To prevail on a [claim
under the Hawai’i Uniform Trade Secrets Act (HUTSA)], a plaintiff must establish that there
exists a trade secret and a misappropriation of that trade secret.”); Yeiser Rsch. & Dev. LLC
v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“To plead a claim under the
Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“DUTSA”), a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a trade
secret existed; (2) the trade secret was communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3)
such communication occurred pursuant to an express or implied understanding that the
secrecy of the matter would be respected; and (4) the trade secret was improperly used or
disclosed by the defendant to the injury of the plaintiff.”).
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Uniform Trade Secrets Act, adopted by the vast majority of states,69
defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.70

Trade secret law, then, grants companies a right to keep certain
valuable information private. The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA),
the federal trade secret law, proffers a substantially identical definition of trade secret and misappropriation thereof.71
Under a private enforcement regime, one individual sues another
in court with a claim of right sounding in either statute or common
law.72 The right to sue also creates the potential for parties to
negotiate out of court.73 Most observers agree that the VPPA
successfully protects privacy, although its scope is narrow.74 Trade
69. Trade Secret, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trade_
secret [https://perma.cc/P7NZ-V2DX].
70. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/us/us034en.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6FD-EDF8].
71. Iacovacci v. Brevet Holdings, LLC, 437 F. Supp. 3d 367, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“To state
a claim for misappropriation under the DTSA, a plaintiff must allege that it possessed a trade
secret that the defendant misappropriated. The elements for a misappropriation claim under
New York law are fundamentally the same.... Since ‘[t]he requirements are similar,’ courts
have found that a ‘[c]omplaint sufficiently plead[ing] a DTSA claim ... also states a claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets under New York law.’” (citations omitted)); Alta Devices,
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 868, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“The elements of [trade
secret] misappropriation under the DTSA are similar to those under the [California Uniform
Trade Secrets Act], ... except that the DTSA applies only to misappropriations that occur or
continue to occur on or after its date of enactment.” (citation omitted)).
72. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. While these particular statutes involve
litigation, it is possible to have private enforcement without litigation in court. See Glover,
supra note 23, at 1146-48.
73. Cf. Elizabeth Graham, The Importance of a Mandatory Arbitration Carve-Out in a US
Privacy Law, IAPP (May 22, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-importance-of-a-mandatoryarbitration-carve-out-in-a-us-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/M4FK-SQJ6].
74. See The Video Privacy Protection Act as a Model Intellectual Privacy Statute, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1766, 1768-69 (2018) (“[T]he VPPA and recent cases deploying the Act suggest
that courts are not hesitant to recognize privacy harms as ‘injuries’ when the harms implicate
intellectual privacy. Because of its broad, technology-neutral language, the VPPA has
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secret law covers a broad range of activity and successfully protects
diverse interests of corporations.75 By contrast, most commentators
find the privacy law torts protecting consumer privacy to be ineffective.76 What may account for this difference in effectiveness?
One answer may be the superior ability of monied interests and repeat players to represent and defend their interests, but while this
may be a salient issue, it is not unique to the protection of privacy.77
In the context of trade secret law, Sharon Sandeen persuasively
argues that input from industry and practitioners in the development of a uniformly adopted state law of trade secret law distinguishes it from the four privacy torts, which are the brainchild of
the reporter for the Restatement of Torts.78 Yet, one main difference
distinguishes general privacy law from trade secret law: ease of
proof of harm.79 Courts seem to have little trouble conceptualizing
misappropriation of a trade secret as a harm.80 In trade secret cases,
the plaintiff usually has purely commercial rather than dignitary
goals.81 By contrast, in privacy cases, many courts have denied relief
managed to weather the past forty years. Though the statute’s effectiveness, like that of any
other statute, depends on reasonable judicial interpretation, the VPPA’s resilience despite
technological and doctrinal changes indicates that the statute might prove an appropriate
model for the next logical step in safeguarding the privacy of expressive activity: federal
reader privacy legislation.”); Ann Stehling, Note, From Blockbuster to Mobile Apps—Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988 Continues to Protect the Digital Citizen, 70 SMU L. REV. 205,
210 (2017); VPPA EPIC, supra note 59 (“[The VPPA] stands as one of the strongest
protections of consumer privacy against a specific form of data collection.”).
75. See, e.g., Abigail M. Luhn & Michael C. Zogby, The Key to a Trade Secret Is Secrecy:
Third Circuit Agrees Ownership Is Sufficient but Not Necessary to Maintain a Trade Secret
Misappropriation Claim, 10 NAT’L L. REV. (June 18, 2020); Ryan L. Marshall, Evi T. Christou
& Theresa L. Starck, From the Salon Chair to Court: L’Oréal Found Liable for Trade Secret
Theft and Patent Infringement, 9 NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 3, 2019). Courts also readily find harm
in right of publicity matters. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Alex Ben Block, A Famed SoCal Soda
Family Just Scored Big Bucks in a Case Against Coca-Cola, L.A. MAG. (June 25, 2020),
https://www.lamag.com/ citythinkblog/hansens-soda-coca-cola-award/ [https://perma.cc/Q75LYGMC].
76. See, e.g., Solow-Niederman, supra note 12, at 614-18.
77. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-99, 103-04 (1974).
78. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade
Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 681-92.
79. See Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 361-62 (2014).
80. See id. at 363-64 (noting that “some jurists and scholars expect privacy harm to
overcome” an (impossibly) high bar).
81. See Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543
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to plaintiffs on the basis that there was no source of relief available
to the plaintiff based on their inability to show harm.82 Ryan Calo
refers to courts’ unique difficulty in finding harm in privacy intrusions as “privacy harm exceptionalism.”83 I have argued elsewhere
that one way to improve private enforcement of privacy claims is to
make restitutionary relief available to plaintiffs, that is, relief measured by defendant’s gain rather than plaintiff ’s loss.84
Many federal courts employ procedural barriers to minimize
access to justice for privacy invasions and dignitary harms more
broadly.85 Public enforcement of privacy matters can occur without
being stymied by judicial skepticism of dignitary harms. Finally,
even to the extent that private enforcement actions reach the court,
there is the worry that private litigants or their lawyers will choose
to advance their own private interests without consideration of the
public interest in transparency of privacy disputes or deterring
future wrongful conduct.86 As a result, private enforcement without
the support and legitimation of a public enforcer may struggle to be
an ongoing source of deterrence for wrongdoers, as the common law
privacy torts have.
C. Hybrid Enforcement Regimes
Hybrid enforcement regimes already exist in privacy law, and
they have proven more effective than regimes that only use public
enforcement. This Section describes and highlights the benefits of
existing hybrid privacy regimes, distilling some general lessons for
how to shape a hybrid enforcement regime for privacy laws.
The three most important examples of federal privacy statutes
that have hybrid enforcement regimes are the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA),87 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),88
(2018).
82. See Calo, supra note 79, at 361-62.
83. Id.
84. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653 (2019).
85. Rachel Bayefsky, Remedies and Respect: Rethinking the Role of Federal Judicial Relief,
109 GEO. L.J. 1263, 1270-73 (2021); Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as
Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 539-56 (2017).
86. See Eric Goldman, The Irony of Privacy Class Action Litigation, 10 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 309, 314-15 (2012).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 227. TCPA regulates telemarketing practices, including prohibiting junk
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and the Driver Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).89 Edward Janger
has observed that unlike the privacy torts, which are of a dignitary
nature and seek primarily to compensate wronged individuals, these
three laws “appear to be directed at using private parties as an
adjunct to, or substitute for, public enforcement.”90 He noted that
each of the private enforcement actions was constructed with awareness that “recovering actual personal damages is not going to be a
sufficient incentive to bring suit.”91
These laws have been largely successful in achieving concrete
outcomes. TCPA limited abusive telemarketing practices, FCRA
limited abuse of consumer credit files, and DPPA has effectively
eliminated the use of drivers’ records as a source of sensitive information. It is no accident they are all hybrid enforcement regimes.
These laws all protect individuals from privacy invasions that
may in each individual instance be relatively small, but the laws
reflect Congress’s judgment that these invasions should not occur.
Public actors can act where small stakes and long odds may make
individual action less likely. Public actors are well-suited for addressing collective problems because class actions with small claims
are increasingly unlikely to pass muster,92 so public avenues may be
the better way to address collective problems. Furthermore,
agencies can provide guidance and administer bright line rules,
faxes and certain types of automated calls. TCPA provides a private right of action.
Individuals may sue for up to $500 for each violation or recover actual monetary loss,
whichever is greater, and/or seek an injunction. In the event of a willful violation of the TCPA,
a subscriber may sue for up to three times the damages.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. FCRA regulates the collection, dissemination, and use of consumer
information by credit agencies. FCRA provides a private right of action with actual, statutory,
and punitive relief. Minimum statutory damages are $100, and actual damages are capped
at $1,000, unless there was a “knowing” violation. The FCRA does not provide for equitable
relief.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2721. DPPA protects personal information collected by state motor
vehicles departments from disclosure to other government officials and private parties. It
creates a private right of action for knowing violations. The remedies available are substantial. The Act provides for payment of actual damages to the extent that they exceed
$2,500, liquidated damages of $2,500 to the extent that the plaintiff is not able to prove
greater damages, punitive damages for willful violations, an award of costs and reasonable
attorney's fees, and equitable relief.
90. Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 899, 907 (2003).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021).
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such as the TCPA’s Do-Not-Call Registry, administered by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and provide ongoing
guidance to industry.
While there are many advantages to public enforcement, the
reality is public enforcers cannot address every instance of wrongful
telemarketing or use of consumer data for credit. Private rights of
action allow every wrong under a statute to be a potential subject of
litigation. Thus, private actors provide the primary incentive for
companies to comply and agencies to continue to enforce these laws
in every interaction with every consumer. Privacy invasions are
personal, and private rights of action allow individuals to seek relief
even if public actors do not have the resources or desire to pursue
that claim. Public actors are often limited in their ability to pursue
action, and even when they do, it can be difficult for them to
actually collect monetary relief on their claim. In its enforcement of
the TCPA, the FCC has issued hundreds of millions of dollars in
fines for robocalls but has only collected on a fraction.93 Private
litigants are more likely to collect damages than a regulatory
agency, which may make the threat of private suit more of a
deterrent. While it is uncertain and potentially expensive to pursue
a privacy claim, a small subset of dogged sticklers and their lawyers
may decide to do so.94 The potential of running into such a stickler
encourages companies to follow the rules just as much as the threat
of a regulatory fine. And given the limits of regulatory action in our
country, the stickler plaintiff with her private right of action feels
more likely, and more painful if it were to occur, than regulatory
oversight. As one court put it, the threat of punitive damages from
a private right of action for erroneous reporting under “the FCRA is
the primary factor deterring erroneous reporting by the credit
reporting industry.”95 A handful of plaintiffs and cases, then, provide
the essential public good of creating case law that helps us

93. Sarah Krouse, The FCC Has Fined Robocallers $208 Million. It’s Collected $6,790.,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fcc-has-fined-robo
callers-208-million-its-collected-6-790-11553770803 [https://perma.cc/N2W2-JFXT].
94. Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik: The Future of Consumer
Activism and What We Can Do to Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV. 929, 931 (2020) (describing a
“nudnik” as a particular type of fussy stickler consumer who forces companies to hold to their
policies, and whose insistence has benefits to other, less litigious consumers).
95. Brim v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1265 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
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understand how the law applies to changing circumstances.96 I say
a handful simply because there are so many obstacles to succeeding
on a privacy claim.97 Yet even if few cases are brought, and fewer
are successful, the benefits of a private right of action hold because
of their deterrence function. The looming threat of individual action
from individual consumers is essential for actually making sure
companies are held accountable to privacy laws. Even unsuccessful
individual cases can draw the agency’s attention to problems. The
public and private elements of a hybrid enforcement regime reinforce one another.
Legality shapes market and infrastructure practices. If the
exercise of private rights of action incentivizes market actors to take
privacy-enhancing behaviors by increasing the power of individuals
to sanction non-privacy protective behavior, the reach of the law to
protect privacy will extend further than if only public regulation is
employed.98 Several empirical studies have shown that “discovery
can unearth otherwise-hidden information on corporate misconduct
and lead to internal corporate reforms.”99 Discovery plays a key role
in corporate law.100 Joanna Schwartz observes that discovery forces
firms to engage in “introspection” about their own practices and can
lead to changes not mandated by judicial action or legal reform.101
Information revealed during discovery can also influence public discussions about reform.102

96. See Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common
Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 600, 600-01, 634-35 (2020) (describing the public good of case law and
how electronic “contractual clauses compelling arbitration and forbidding claim aggregation”
stifle the development of case law).
97. See Peter C. Ormerod, Privacy Injuries and Article III Concreteness, 48 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 133, 133-35 (2020); Curtis R. Crooke, Comment, Reply ‘Stop’ to Cancel: Whether Receiving One Unwanted Marketing Text Message Confers Standing in Federal Court, 62 B.C.
L. REV. E. SUPP. II.-84, II.-101 (2021).
98. See Justin H. Dion & Nicholas M. Smith, Consumer Protection—Exploring Private
Causes of Action for Victims of Data Breaches, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 253, 257, 267, 275
(2019).
99. Diego A. Zambrano, Discovery As Regulation, 119 MICH. L. REV. 71, 75 n.13 (2020).
100. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law,” 63 EMORY L.J.
1383, 1495-96 (2014).
101. Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055,
1055 (2015).
102. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 100, at 1427, 1495-96.
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In addition to providing access to the private sphere, private
actions provide access to private expertise. Many of the relevant
incidents happening in the private sphere—based in new, quickly
evolving technical practices—outpace public actors’ capabilities and
complicate privacy regulation.103 One of the reasons tendered for a
lack of a federal omnibus privacy law is the lack of stable practices
and public understanding of good policy in light of fast innovation,
spawning fear of harming innovation in the service of protecting
privacy.104 To some extent, the portrayal of technology as simply too
complex and difficult to regulate is a strategy to avoid regulation.105
Yet, private enforcement is an essential tool for regulating technology.106
Private enforcement brings interactions in the private sphere to
the surface for evaluation by public actors.107 Without private enforcement, there is simply too much that is beyond the access and
capability of the state’s grasp.108 The state does not understand

103. See Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, 452 (Super. Ct. 2012) (“The
development of technology has long outpaced the development of our laws.”); In re Innovatio
IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (order granting pretrial
declaratory judgment) (“Any tension between that conclusion and the public’s expectation of
privacy is the product of the law’s constant struggle to keep up with changing technology. Five
or ten years ago, sniffing technology might have been more difficult to obtain, and the court’s
conclusion might have been different. But it is not the court’s job to update the law to provide
protection for consumers against ever changing technology. Only Congress, after balancing
any competing policy interests, can play that role.”); Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d
589, 591 (Ind. 2001) (“We live in an age when technology pushes us quickly ahead, and the
law struggles to keep up. In this case, we encounter for the first time assumption of identity
via the Internet. A number of existing statutes and common law precepts seem to serve
surprisingly well in this dramatic new environment.”); see also discussion of privacy problems
infra Part III.
104. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 913 (“Thus, there was considerable caution in the United
States in the 1970s against a broad regulation of information use that would include the
private and public sectors in one fell swoop. This orientation demonstrates an ideology that
I term ‘regulatory parsimony.’ As the medical profession expresses the idea, ‘above all, do no
harm.’”).
105. See, e.g., Kevin Maney, The Law Can’t Keep up with Technology ... and That’s a Very
Good Thing, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2015, 2:27 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/governmentgets-slower-tech-gets-faster-389073 [https://perma.cc/5Y94-7NVT] (“Speed to critical mass
turns out to be a great strategy in the face of rickety laws and oblivious lawmakers. The faster
companies move, the less government can get in their way.”).
106. See Dion & Smith, supra note 98, at 257.
107. See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 57-58 (2017).
108. See id.
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enough about new technosocial practices to immediately determine
how best to regulate them.109
There is socioeconomic space and activity outside the sight of the
state, which exists by design.110 Denying the state access to societal
space, which I will call a “private sphere,” without express permission has many civil rights benefits in a liberal society.111 However,
if the government cannot access the private sphere, it also cannot
directly regulate wrongs that occur there. Some privacy violations
are unlikely to be directly observed by the state, which makes private enforcement an essential tool for learning about these wrongs.
When I refer to a private sphere free from government surveillance and intervention, I mean that in two ways. First, I mean
spaces and resources that government cannot access or observe.112
An example of this is a locked analog safe containing analog items
on private property. Second, I mean spaces, information, and resources that may be visible to anyone but only interpretable by
people with either proprietary interpretative tools, or highly specialized skills that only high-demand, highly compensated people in
private industry tend to have.113 This makes government access
impossible or highly unlikely, respectively, without private collaboration or a court order.114 Examples of this latter type of private
109. See Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, 452 (Super. Ct. 2012); Alex Engler,
What All Policy Analysts Need to Know About Data Science, BROOKINGS (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-all-policy-analysts-need-to-know-about-datascience/ [https://perma.cc/9FHY-FS9F].
110. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 12, at 1416-17.
111. See, e.g., Louise Marie Roth, The Right to Privacy Is Political: Power, the Boundary
Between Public and Private, and Sexual Harassment, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 45, 45-46 (1999).
The precise scope of the private sphere is a contested concept in the literature. G. Alex Sinha,
A Real-Property Model of Privacy, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 572 (2019). Some contest the
usefulness of a notion of a private sphere in privacy law at all. E.g., Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1131-32 (2002) (observing that “the
metaphor of space has significant limitations,” and that “[w]e can avoid allowing the metaphor
of space to limit our understanding of privacy”). The skepticism of a private sphere parasites
on the assumption of a pre-political private law that lacks rule of law considerations. See
discussion infra Part III.E.
112. See Roth, supra note 111, at 57-58 (arguing that the ability of the government to
surveil divides the private and public spheres).
113. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 697, 702 (2018).
114. See id. Some argue that collaborative governance is a way to bring private sector
expertise into governance. E.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 76 (1997). Collaborative governance is defined as “[a]
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sphere include an algorithm with public outputs, such as a search
engine, a high-speed trading software, or an internet of things (IoT)
smart product.115 While all can see the algorithm’s designated output, individuals outside of the firm would face significant difficulties
evaluating the algorithm’s sources and determining whether its
output reflects illegal or immoral intent on the part of its creators.116
In both senses, the private sphere is particularly important to the
regulation of privacy. Access to the private sphere is a prerequisite
for addressing many privacy wrongs. Many invasions of privacy
occur in private, where no outside party can observe what is
happening in order to contest its wrongfulness;117 for example, a
wrongful sale of consumer information between private parties.
Expertise barriers are also salient in the area of privacy.118 Many
novel data protection deficiencies and methods of digital market
manipulation are too complicated for regulators to readily understand.119 Civil litigation brings practices to light that regulators may
not even know to look for.120 What is more, translation through
governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state
stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and
deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or
assets.” Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 543, 544 (2008). While expertise of this type is valuable, it is
of a different character from expertise brought to bear on a specific dispute. LAHAV, supra note
107, at 56-61 (discussing the information value of litigation). The context of a dispute also
changes the way information is presented and analyzed in a way that is more useful for
democracy. Id. at 58 (“[L]itigation can combine the facts and the law to produce narratives
and provide explanations for why past events occurred, frameworks for addressing hurtful
incidents, and opportunities for healing as a result.”). Furthermore, “in political discourse people can rely on misrepresentations, speculations, and hyperbole, but a trial is exacting and
challenges such assertions.” Id. at 66.
115. See generally Tam Harbert, Practical Uses of the Internet of Things in Government Are
Everywhere, GOV’T TECH. (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.govtech.com/network/practical-uses-ofthe-internet-of-things-in-government-are-everywhere.html [https://perma.cc/VL96-ZYC7]
(identifying the lack of understanding in government of IoT data outputs as a barrier to
implementation of progressive technologies).
116. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 718, 725 (2016).
117. See, e.g., Roth, supra 111, at 63-67.
118. See Engler, supra note 109.
119. See id.
120. See LAHAV, supra note 107, at 57-58; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Alexandra
D. Lahav, Information for the Common Good in Mass Torts, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 345, 353-360
(2021) (describing examples of how transparency in tort litigation informed the public and
regulators of hitertho unknown or poorly understood hazardous products and practices).
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analogy of specialist information into generalist terms is the particular virtue of judges.121 It is important that these issues become
cognizable to the public so that norms can emerge about what
behavior is wrongful.
Private enforcement’s acute information-forcing and diagnostic
analytical properties are necessary to undergird public law regulations.122 Many of the fact patterns and technical knowledge lawmakers need in order to regulate privacy are ensconced deep within the
private sphere, and we need robust private enforcement of privacy
law to flush them out.123
The scope and resources of public enforcement paired with the
potential for uncompromising, stickler private plaintiffs to insist on
enforcing the law leads to ongoing, thoughtful enforcement of
privacy law. Comparing the hybrid enforcement of privacy laws to
purely public and purely private enforcement illustrates the wisdom of including both elements. Private enforcement has an
important role to play in regulating newly possible, poorly understood phenomena because it allows for broad, resilient, innovative
enforcement.124

121. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 767-68, 784,
787 (1993).
122. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Information-Forcing Dilemma in Damages Law, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 81, 91-92 (2017) (discussing how, in litigation, burdens of proof serve as an
“information-forcing mechanism,” and that without such burdens, courts would have no
framework for acquiring evidence or making decisions); Alex Reinert, Pleading as
Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 29-30 (2012) (“The classic justification for
information-forcing rules, stemming from Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of contract law, is that
they provide an incentive for the party with the best access to private information to disclose
it to a contracting party or third parties. These information-forcing rules are meant, among
other things, to decrease transaction costs for third parties.” (footnotes omitted)).
123. See Zambrano, supra note 99, at 75 n.13. There is well-developed literature on the use
of default rules in contract law to force knowledgeable parties to share information relevant
for claims and regulation. E.g., J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing
Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 904 (2015); Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 557 (2006); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1580-81 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
97 (1989) (arguing that “penalty default” rules in contract law incentivize disclosure).
124. Cf. Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate Limits of Science in the
Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 157, 177 (2003)
(affirming limits of scientific expertise for answering moral and political questions).
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Private enforcement can be “a dramatically effective source of
deterrence.”125 Accountability and deterrence are sorely needed in
the privacy space. The struggles of the FTC in this space show that
public enforcement has not proven an adequate check on unfair and
deceptive privacy practices. A generic concern about private enforcement is overdeterrence,126 but when considering private rights
of action it is important to consider the cause of action proposed and
the specific regulatory context. Support for public enforcement is
essential to ensure any real accountability for firms. A limited
private right of action, for example a right to an explanation for an
algorithm’s output, can serve many of the information forcing and
deterrence functions extolled here. As Bruce Klaw has observed in
the context of Federal Corrupt Practices Act private enforcement,
“criminological research shows that likelihood of detection and
subsequent sanction, rather than severity of sanction is the key
determinant to deterrence.”127 Private rights of action need not be
broad with extreme penalties to serve the functions of deterrence
and additional regulatory coverage. Tailoring the private right of
action through statutory framing or administrative guidance can
influence the amount of private enforcement to attain the desired
amount of deterrence.128
II. DIGNITY AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Private rights of action accord individuals the power to enforce
their own rights, thereby affirming the dignitary status of

125. Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 359 (2012).
126. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 114 (2005) (“[P]rivate rights
of action can lead to inefficiently high levels of enforcement, causing waste of judicial
resources and leading to excessive deterrence of socially beneficial activity.”).
127. Klaw, supra note 125, at 360.
128. FARHANG, supra note 28, at 21-31 (describing ways legislatures can exercise control
over the amount of private litigation arising from a private right of action); see also
Stephenson, supra note 126, at 95-96, 121-43 (arguing executive agencies should play an
enhanced role in shaping private enforcement policy).
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citizens.129 This Part contributes a framework for understanding
private enforcement of privacy rights as essential.130
Private rights of action uniquely speak to the dignity of the citizen by putting power to contest wrongs in her hands and allowing
the individual to construct claims as entitlements.131 Each of these
specific implications is of particular importance in privacy regulation.
Private enforcement is significant for citizen engagement and
identity.132 Private enforcement takes the form of a suit brought by
one member of society against another, making a claim or right.133
The right to bring suit has meaning, and the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff’s success accentuates that right.134 Private law
in its individual-to-individual, confrontational form speaks to the
dignity and power of each citizen,135 as its origins as the sole source
of rights for English citizens suggests.136 Individuals attach greater
value to rights they possess versus interests provided at the sovereign’s leisure.137
129. See, e.g., Anuradha Joshi, Legal Empowerment and Social Accountability:
Complementary Strategies Toward Rights-Based Development in Health?, 99 WORLD DEV. 160,
160-61 (2017).
130. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 120 (2012).
131. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 12, at 1416.
132. Id. at 1416-17.
133. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Private Law Statutory Interpretation, 92 S.
CAL. L. REV. 949, 949 (2019) (defining private law as horizontal interactions between members
of society).
134. See, e.g., Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 12, at 1416-22.
135. See Ori J. Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 99, 109 (2015)
(“Th[e] power to expose others to the power of courts is, of course, a general feature of civil
litigation, which is not restrictive to the context of tort victims and tortfeasors, but mostly
available to all would-be plaintiffs.”); Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 32 (2011) (defending civil recourse as a way of vindicating one’s honor);
Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 259-62 (2011)
(defending civil recourse as a way of maintaining social equality); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 327,
336, 338 (2011) (defending civil recourse as means of self-restoration); see also Matthew A.
Shapiro, Civil Wrongs and Civil Procedure, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW 87,
93-94 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 271-72
(2016) (analyzing property and contract in terms of civil recourse).
136. Ariel Katz, Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the Rule of Law: Between Private
Power and State Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 633, 650 (2016).
137. Cf. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (defining “endowment effect” as the phenomenon of people demanding
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As Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman put it:
Since private law is the law of our horizontal interactions, its
roles cannot be properly performed by any other legal field. Only
private law can forge and sustain the variety of frameworks for
interdependent interpersonal relationships that allow us to form
and lead the conception of our lives. Only private law can cast
these frameworks of relationships as interactions between free
and equal individuals who respect each other for the persons
they actually are and thereby vindicate our claims to relational
justice from one another.138

The form of private enforcement speaks to its unique function in a
liberal society: it is not merely an incidental form of regulation, but
a statement about the status of each person in our society.139
The person, as a rights-bearer, is particularly important in
privacy law.140 Some authors contend that ongoing relationships of
trust between information-age firms and customers—in which opportunism, incentives, and options abound for the firm—create
fiduciary duties to customers.141 The reconceptualization of the citizen in the information age as an agent with powers, rather than
just a passive user, would have important social consequences.142
There has been much ink spilled on the problem of data protection
exhaustion, the concept that citizens resign to having their data
exploited as an inevitable consequence of existing in society.143 A
more to give up an object they own than they would be willing to pay to acquire it).
138. Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 12, at 1398.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1397-98.
141. E.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships
in Information Age Consumer Transactions, 46 J. CORP. L. 143, 144, 158-59 (2020).
142. Cf. Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—And How to
Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/whyprotecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/
ZN4M-546N] (describing the negative consequences of depriving individuals of privacy rights
in the information age).
143. See, e.g., Brian Stanton, Mary F. Theofanos, Sandra Spickard Prettyman & Susanne
Furman, Security Fatigue, 18 IT PRO. 26, 26 (2016); Brooke Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica
Anderson, Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kumar & Erica Turner, Americans and Privacy: Concerned,
Confused and Feeling Lack of Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov.
15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concernedconfused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/76KJ4SAX] (“A majority of Americans believe their online and offline activities are being tracked
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private enforcement regime to give citizens meaningful options to
contest data practices has benefits beyond altering the law. After
all, many citizens lack the time or resources to pursue data
protection claims, and if they do their efforts may not be successful.144 The expressive function of private enforcement increases
individuals’ belief in their own agency as members of society and
rights-bearers.145 Bolstering that sense of agency is important in the
internet age—with respect to privacy in particular—because of its
connection to the preconditions of liberal democracy.146 Through
technology, small claims litigation may be made easier and cheaper
for claimants.147
Private rights of action avoid the problem of under-enforcement
by an administrative agency leading to the nonenforcement of a
right.148 Privacy invasions, like other torts, are too socially pervasive
for one or even multiple administrative authorities to satisfactorily
identify, investigate, and adjudicate in all instances.149
and monitored by companies and the government with some regularity. It is such a common
condition of modern life that roughly six-in-ten U.S. adults say they do not think it is possible
to go through daily life without having data collected about them by companies or the
government.”).
144. See Joseph Jerome, Private Right of Action Shouldn’t Be a Yes-No Proposition in
Federal US Privacy Litigation, IAPP (Oct. 3, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/private-right-ofaction-shouldnt-be-a-yes-no-proposition-in-federal-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/V7YPXDS3] (identifying court costs and minimal available damages under existing and prospective
rights of action as dissuading factors for bringing a privacy suit).
145. See Herstein, supra note 135, at 101.
146. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 11 (2015) (“[P]rivacy [is] necessary to produce speech ... privacy has three
essential elements—freedom of thought, the right to read freely, and the right to communicate
in confidence.”).
147. See generally Matt Byrne, Global Litigation 50: Does Legal Tech = Lower Litigation
Fees, and Other Tech Dilemmas, THE LAW. (Sept. 4, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://
www.thelawyer.com/legal-technology-litigation-law-firms-top-50/ [https://perma.cc/4XW8LU7C] (describing the development of “largely tech-driven methods of litigating,” which will
“deliver projects more quickly and cheaply”); Janet Walker & Garry D. Watson, New Trends
in Procedural Law: New Technologies and the Civil Litigation Process, 31 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMPAR. L. REV. 251, 286 (2008) (positing that technological advances will “[m]ak[e] the civil
justice system more accessible” and less expensive for the majority of Americans); Richard M.
Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 242, 255-56 (2019) (“But for any given level of technically attainable accuracy, use of AI
adjudication would lower costs.”).
148. See Clopton, supra note 22, at 295-308.
149. Cf. Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 293, 303 (2007) (explaining how administrative agencies cannot adequately monitor the
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This Part’s analysis leads to some broader conclusions for privacy
advocates beyond simply the import of private rights of action in
privacy legislation. In order for the benefits rehearsed here to accrue, there must be a practical means for individuals to bring
cases.150 There are legal and practical barriers to bringing privacy
lawsuits. To make private rights of action for privacy rights effective, the surrounding regime must support them.
The two principal legal barriers keeping privacy matters out of
court are elevated harm requirements for privacy matters,151 and
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.152 Courts are
often hesitant to deliver distributive justice if legislatures have been
silent or ambivalent on an issue.153 Yet, if state legislatures and
Congress take decisive action on privacy, that worry will dissipate.154 Judges could move away from interpretations that keep
privacy matters out of court.155 Clear legislative instructions could
also spur courts along this path.156
The practical barrier to privacy lawsuits comes, of course, at the
expense of plaintiffs.157 Awarding attorney’s fees for successful
plaintiffs, as is allowed by the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act, could
ameliorate this barrier.158
The next Part applies this general framework to individual privacy problems of the day to illustrate its relevance.

countless incidents of consumer misuse of products).
150. Cf. Kerry, supra note 142 (arguing that the lack of a practical means for individuals
to bring privacy suits degrades individual rights).
151. See Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
152. See Graham, supra note 73.
153. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
67 (1988).
154. But see Citron & Solove, supra note 151.
155. But see id.
156. See Jennifer Bryant, 2021 ‘Best Chance’ for US Privacy Legislation, IAPP (Dec. 7,
2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/2021-best-chance-for-federal-privacy-legislation/ [https://
perma.cc/U9KK-JWKX].
157. Dayton Uttinger, How Much Does It Cost to File a Civil Suit and When Should You?,
FISCAL TIGER (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.fiscaltiger.com/how-much-does-it-cost-file-civil-suit/
[https://perma.cc/Z4QL-PFYN].
158. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).
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III. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND MODERN PRIVACY PROBLEMS
This Part addresses a suite of privacy issues in the modern
information ecosystem. Showing how private enforcement can help
address the major privacy problems of the day makes concrete the
two independent justifications of Parts I and II: deterrence and
citizen dignity, respectively.159 For each privacy issue, I outline the
problem, evaluate the deterrence and dignity benefits of private
enforcement, and discuss sector-specific challenges. The discussion
of private enforcement’s role in regulating these privacy problems
is intentionally cursory. The point is to model how the general
justifications for private enforcement map onto addressing specific
privacy problems.
A. Nonconsensual Pornography
Nonconsensual pornography, sometimes called revenge pornography, is the distribution of pornographic images of a person
without their approval.160 The distributor intends to humiliate and
harm the victim.161 Technological innovation facilitates this type of
wrong.162 While individuals may have wished to embarrass others
by distributing such images prior to the information age, the ability
to publicly distribute and alter images and videos with ease has only
been possible since the early 2000s.163 Victims of nonconsensual
159. See discussion supra Parts I-II.
160. Yanet Ruvalcaba & Asia A. Eaton, Nonconsensual Pornography Among U.S. Adults:
A Sexual Scripts Framework on Victimization, Perpetration, and Health Correlates for Women
and Men, 10 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 68, 68 (2020) (“Though the media has often used the term
revenge porn to describe nonconsensual pornography, there are important distinctions
between those two terms. First, revenge porn implies the dissemination of images for the
purpose of humiliating or harming the victim. Nonconsensual pornography, however, is not
always motivated by revenge. Second, the term revenge porn implies that the victim
instigated the harm by doing something for which the perpetrator is seeking revenge,
supporting rape myths that blame victims for their own abuse. For these reasons, and others,
scholars and advocates tend not to use the term revenge porn.” (citations omitted)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Karolina Mania, The Legal Implications and Remedies Concerning Revenge Porn
and Fake Porn: A Common Law Perspective, 24 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 2079, 2082 (2020)
(providing a historical background of key moments in nonconsensual pornography, including
an early example of reader photos accepted and published by Hustler in the early 1980s, some
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pornography may be psychologically damaged and exposed to personal and professional losses.164 Women are disproportionately
impacted by this type of wrong.165 Nonconsensual pornography is
the most prominent of a family of practices that expose and commodify the naked bodies and intimate details of people.166
Although there is no federal statute on this topic,167 the vast
majority of states have criminalized nonconsensual pornography,
and many have also created civil private rights of action for
victims.168 In 2013, only three states criminalized nonconsensual
pornography.169 As of January 2022, forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have nonconsensual pornography laws.170 In
2018, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) approved the Uniform
Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images
Act—model legislation that establishes civil remedies for victims of
nonconsensual pornography, and “[a]bout a dozen state laws currently allow for a private right of action against those who disclose
of which turned out to have been submitted without the consent of the photo’s subject).
164. Benjamin Powers, Revenge Porn Can Haunt You for Years, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 26,
2019), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/cost-of-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/N5E6-LMGS].
165. Lindsay Holcomb, The Role of Torts in the Fight Against Nonconsensual Pornography,
27 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 261, 267 (2021) (“Ninety-three percent of the victims
of nonconsensual porn are female, and images of women make up the vast majority of content
posted on websites dedicated to nonconsensual pornography. Men are twice as likely to have
shared nonconsensual porn than women, and women are 2.5 times as likely to have been
threatened with nonconsensual porn.... Finally, nonconsensual porn is perpetrated against
sexual minorities at rates slightly higher than against individuals who identify as
heterosexual.” (footnotes omitted)).
166. See Danielle Keats Citron, A New Compact for Sexual Privacy, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1763, 1783 (2021).
167. A federal bill has been proposed, but it has not been passed. See Intimate Privacy
Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong.
168. Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 1251, 1269 (2017); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014).
169. See Franks, supra note 168, at 1255.
170. See 48 States + DC + Two Territories Now Have Laws Against Nonconsensual
Pornography, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://cybercivilrights.org/nonconsensual-pornagraphylaws/ [https://perma.cc/25JN-6V9B]; AG FITCH: Criminalizing Revenge Porn Gives Victims
Hope, Dignity, and a Better Future, Y’ALL POL. (May 20, 2021), https://yallpolitics.com/
2021/05/20/ag-fitch-criminalizing-revenge-porn-gives-victims-hope-dignity-and-a-betterfuture/ [https://perma.cc/87XK-A5WZ] (“On April 16, 2021, Governor Reeves signed into law
S.B. 2121, ... criminalizing ‘revenge porn’ and protecting innocent people from repeated
victimization.”). Two states—South Carolina and Massachusetts—have proposed legislation.
See Revenge Porn Act, S. 567, 123d Sess. (S.C. 2019); H.R. 76, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019).
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intimate images without consent.”171 The ULC underscored the
importance of a private right of action in the Act’s preamble:
“[w]hile criminal law can serve as an important deterrent and expression of social condemnation, civil law is better suited to
compensate victims for the harm they have suffered.” Civil law
allows victims to use the lower “preponderance of the evidence”
standard inherent in civil cases to receive relief. Furthermore,
victims can receive compensatory damages for mental distress and
reputational harm from the wrong.172 More broadly, enabling
victims to sue empowers the victims and allows them to take their
fate into their own hands.173 Given the personal consequences and
dignitary harm a victim of nonconsensual pornography faces, it
seems unjust to allow whether the perpetrator sees justice to come
down to whether an overburdened or unwilling prosecutor sees fit
to take the case.174
State nonconsensual pornography laws can target not only individuals who post nonconsensual pornography, but also—with more
difficulty—websites and platforms that host nonconsensual pornography.175 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
generally shields website hosts and providers from liability,176 but
websites that actively encourage the behavior may be liable for
nonconsensual pornography distribution.177 The flurry of legislation
171. Pam Greenberg, Fighting Revenge Porn and ‘Sextortion,’ LEGISBRIEF (Aug. 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/legisbriefs/2019/AugustLBs/Revenge-Porn-andSextortion_29.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH3C-8UD7]; see also Civil Remedies for Unauthorized
Disclosure of Intimate Images Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=668f6afa-f7b5-444b-9f0a-6873fb617ebb
[https://perma.cc/RRB6-EK2K] (reporting that six states—Arkansas, Iowa, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Colorado, and West Virginia—have enacted the model legislation, and two
states—Missouri and Arizona—have introduced such bills).
172. Jayne S. Ressler, Anonymous Plaintiffs and Sexual Misconduct, 50 SETON HALL L.
REV. 955, 968-70 (2020).
173. Id.; see also Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time's
Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 76-78 (describing the role money damages
can play in psychologically making victims whole).
174. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1879-81 (2019).
175. See Franks, supra note 168, at 1286-95 (describing the characteristics of state statutes
with examples).
176. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
177. Karla Utset, Note, Drawing the Line: The Jurisprudence of Non-Consensual
Pornography and the Implications of Kanye West’s Famous Music Video, 72 U. MIA. L. REV.
920, 928 (2018) (“[C]ourts interpreting Section 230 sharply distinguish between ISPs ‘who
simply host third-party content and those who actively participate in the creation of illegal
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on nonconsensual pornography has led to changes in business
practices outside the courtroom. These laws have led many platforms to revise their terms of service to prohibit nonconsensual
pornography and to filter such content, notwithstanding the protection that section 230 provides platforms.178
The widespread adoption of nonconsensual pornography legislation is one of the law’s greatest expansions of the privacy interest
in recent years. States recognized an important privacy interest and
reinforced existing law to better protect it. Sexual privacy, although
it has its own unique characteristics,179 is undoubtedly among the
interests protected in the general genus of privacy.180 State legislation started out focused on criminalizing nonconsensual pornography, yet that has given way to a more recent trend of having civil
private rights of action as well. The near-universal criminalization
of nonconsensual pornography has given way to understanding nonconsensual pornography as a civil wrong as well. What’s more,
courts have declined to strike down nonconsensual pornography
laws on First Amendment grounds.181 Nonconsensual pornography
is an area of privacy law that has a clear positive trend.
content.’” (quoting Andrew McDiarmid, Decisive Section 230 Victory for GoDaddy in Revenge
Porn Case, CDT: BLOG (Apr. 15, 2014), https://cdt.org/blog/decisive-section-230-victory-forgodaddy-in-revenge-porn-case/)).
178. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1764-65 (2019) (“For instance,
content platforms have terms-of-service agreements, which ban certain forms of content based
on companies’ values. They experience pressure from, or adhere to legal mandates of, governments to block or filter certain information like hate speech or ‘fake news.’” (footnotes
omitted)); Franks, supra note 168, at 1278 (“In January 2015, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) issued a complaint and a proposed consent order against Craig Brittain, the owner of
the (now defunct) revenge porn site Is Anybody Down. The complaint alleged that Brittain
engaged in unlawful business practices by obtaining sexually explicit material of women
through misrepresentation and deceit and disseminating this material for profit. According
to the terms of the settlement, Brittain must destroy all such material and is barred from
distributing such material in the future without the ‘affirmative express consent in writing’
of the individuals depicted. In doing so, the FTC effectively declared the business model of
revenge porn sites to be unlawful—a tremendous vindication for the victims of nonconsensual
pornography.” (footnotes omitted)).
179. See generally Citron, supra note 174.
180. See Roni Rosenberg & Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Reconceptualizing Revenge Porn, 63
ARIZ. L. REV. 199, 218-20 (2021) (arguing that nonconsensual pornography should be
conceptualized as a sex offense, and not merely a privacy offense, but conceding that nonconsensual pornography is a privacy violation).
181. See, e.g., People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 466, 472 (Ill. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
233 (2020).
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Yet, privacy literature rarely highlights the success of nonconsensual pornography legislation as a model for future effective
privacy legislation. There are several possible reasons for this.182 I
will focus on the two most likely. First, privacy scholarship has a
near-unanimous skepticism of sectoral legislation.183 Legislators
cannot anticipate all the forms privacy problems may take or even
the sectors that will be most important to regulate. So, one may not
look to nonconsensual pornography legislation as a blueprint
because of concerns about its limited scope. Second, nonconsensual
pornography is somewhat exceptional among privacy interests
insofar as its visceral immediacy. Privacy law, in general, is plagued
by the perception that privacy harms are based on subjective
personal preferences.184 By contrast, there is deep-seated American
cultural conservatism around nudity and sexual privacy.185 Thus, it
proved easy to build political consensus around the need to protect
this particular privacy interest, but there is skepticism that the
path nonconsensual pornography legislation took could be followed
by other privacy interests or a more general privacy interest.186 Yet,
recent conversations about privacy have revealed that consensus
on a more general right of privacy is possible. While only three
182. One, unfortunately, may be the tendency for scholarship not squarely addressing
gender to ignore scholarship focusing on issues that predominately impact women. See
Christopher A. Cotropia & Lee Petherbridge, Gender Disparity in Law Review Citation Rates,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 777 (2018). Furthermore, women write most of the scholarship
on nonconsensual pornography, and there is a proven bias in academia against citing articles
by authors with female names. Id. at 771; cf. Katherine A. Mitchell, The Privacy Hierarchy:
A Comparative Analysis of the Intimate Privacy Protection Act vs. the Geolocational Privacy
and Surveillance Act, 73 U. MIA. L. REV. 569, 614 (2019) (“With the advent of legislative
reform in the United States protecting women’s rights, the criminal legal landscape has
dramatically changed. Yet, our country is still plagued by a lack of recognition for women’s
rights to sexual, physical, and expressive autonomy—a fundamental flaw underlining the
reason why there may be a societal lack of empathy for victims of nonconsensual pornography.”).
183. See, e.g., BJ Ard, The Limits of Industry-Specific Privacy Law, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 607
(2015).
184. Will Rinehart, What Exactly Constitutes a Privacy Harm?, AM. ACTION F. (June 1,
2016), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/exactly-constitutes-privacy-harm/
[https://perma.cc/QQH2-PH68].
185. See Franks, supra note 168, at 1260 (discussing how there are generally negative
perceptions about nudity and displays of sexual conduct).
186. But see Mitchell, supra note 182, at 572 (arguing that it is difficult to get nonconsensual pornography legislation passed relative to more gender-neutral Geolocational
Privacy and Surveillance (GPS) legislation).
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states have passed privacy legislation, the majority of states are
seriously exploring the prospect.187 What is stymieing legislation
from passing is not a lack of agreement on whether there is a
general privacy right but on how effective enforcement of that right
should be.188 So the path of nonconsensual pornography in statehouses is instructive and encouraging for a more general privacy
right at the state level.
Nonconsensual pornography legislation offers valuable lessons
about the form privacy law should take if it is to succeed in protecting a privacy interest.189 An emphasis on private rights of action
could further deter and prevent distribution of nonconsensual pornography. Of course, the rights of action further the interests of the
victims, but having a civil action for individuals does more than
this. One small claims case could draw attention to an issue with a
platform. Private enforcement creates an additional avenue for
society to have conversations about sexual misconduct.
Most significantly, the dignitary aspect of this wrong is predominant. Whether a victim of this abuse is able to seek relief should at
least potentially come down to her choice, not the whim of a public
servant. To the extent that there is conflict between deterrence and
civil recourse goals of private enforcement, civil recourse should
carry the day. Yet deterrence separately strongly calls for private
enforcement, given the public interest in avoiding these wrongs
from occurring in the first place.
B. Data Insecurity
The interconnectedness of devices via the internet has made
information exponentially more vulnerable to theft and misappropriation.190 This includes highly sensitive information, such as medical information collected in real time from the body191 and physical

187. Klosowski, supra note 35.
188. Id.
189. See generally Mitchell, supra note 182, at 606 (noting the overlapping areas that other
privacy issues have with nonconsensual pornography).
190. Max Meglio, Note, Embracing Insecurity: Harm Reduction Through a No-Fault
Approach to Consumer Data Breach Litigation, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1223, 1247-48 (2020).
191. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77, 81-86
(2019).
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location data.192 Protecting data necessarily involves tradeoffs. For
example, effective network security is often expensive and can
diminish user experience.193 Moreover, because network intrusions
are considered inevitable, industry has focused on cyber resiliency—managing risk and mitigating the impact of intrusions.194
Companies weigh the costs of additional cybersecurity measures
against the potential costs of an intrusion.195 As a result, many
companies that offer consumer-facing devices, platforms, and
databases underinvest in cybersecurity measures because of the low
cost of consumer cybersecurity failures. Although data breach disclosure laws require companies to disclose data breaches impacting
consumers, the lack of a private right of action insulates companies
from the costs associated with data breaches that compromise
consumer data.196 Under the status quo, companies are able to allow
their users to absorb the costs of data breach failures because
opportunities for seeking direct compensation for data breaches are
highly limited.
Many highly publicized hacks of large consumer databases have
exposed many people’s personal data.197 Victims of such hacks could
192. See generally Meglio, supra note 190, at 1250 (discussing how consumers often are too
willing to trade personal data at the expense of privacy and security).
193. See Steve Morgan, Global Cybersecurity Spending Predicted to Exceed $1 Trillion from
2017-2021, CYBERCRIME MAG. (June 10, 2019), https://cybersecurityventures.com/cyber
security-market-report/ [https://perma.cc/UNW9-EH4F]; James Brown, The Art of Balancing
User Experience and Security, USABILITY GEEK, https://usabilitygeek.com/user-experience-andsecurity/ [https://perma.cc/8936-A3W2] (noting the need to balance user experience with
security).
194. Steve Banker, If Preventing a Cybersecurity Attack Is Impossible..., FORBES (Mar. 3,
2015, 7:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker/2015/03/03/if-preventing-cyber
security-attacks-is-impossible/ [https://perma.cc/67YW-WAAX] (“[I]ntrusions may be all but
certain for every organization.”); ACCENTURE, THE NATURE OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSE: SHIFTING
FROM CYBERSECURITY TO CYBER RESILIENCE 3 (2018), https://www.accenture.com/acnmedia/
accenture/conversion-assets/dotcom/documents/local/en/accenture-shifting-from-cybersecurityto-cyber-resilience-pov.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F2M-VUEC] (“Absolute security is absolutely
impossible.”); Daniel Dobrygowski, Cyber Resilience: Everything You (Really) Need to Know,
WORLD ECON. F. (July 8, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/cyber-resiliencewhat-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/8PHD-37DH] (comparing cybersecurity and cyber resilience).
195. See Toby Shackleton, A Cost-Benefit Analysis Approach to Cyber Security, SIX
DEGREES (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.6dg.co.uk/blog/cost-benefit-approach-to-cyber-security/
[https://perma.cc/7ZLU-4AGH].
196. See Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1003-04 (2018)
(explaining that, despite experiencing a cyber incident three years earlier, Sony continued to
underinvest in cybersecurity measures—leading to a subsequent attack in 2014).
197. Gregory S. Gaglione, Jr., Comment, The Equifax Data Breach: An Opportunity to
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face anything from financial damage, to humiliation, to longerrunning harms.198 Data insecurity makes individuals vulnerable not
only to private actors but to governments as well. The U.S. government and others take full advantage of the porous information
society ecosystem to learn about citizens for the purposes of public
safety, crime prevention, and perhaps other, less wholesome
purposes.199
Since the early 2000s, states have enacted data breach laws that
provide public law enforcement with mechanisms intended to protect consumers’ personal information.200 Generally, such laws
require companies maintaining consumer data to employ reasonable
security practices and to notify consumers and state enforcement
authorities when consumer data has been compromised.201 However,
they have failed to encourage companies to increase their standard
of care at the pace at which hackers are improving their hacking
techniques.202
In response to these concerns, some commentators have recently
proposed support for public law regulations.203 Some of these proposals advocate for new causes of action to be awarded due to the
inadequacy of current tort and contract law to describe the nature
of the threat represented by data insecurity.204 Others argue that
the main obstacle facing plaintiffs is the difficulty of proving harm
and find that—rather than new causes of action—new ways of
formalizing and recognizing the harm presented by data insecurity
are needed.205 There are also intermediate approaches. For example,

Improve Consumer Protection and Cybersecurity Efforts in America, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1133,
1137-47 (2019) (describing the recent history of data breaches).
198. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 774 (2018).
199. Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 577 (2018) (describing the
practice and outlining the law of government hacking).
200. See Carol M. Hayes, Comparative Analysis of Data Breach Laws: Comprehension,
Interpretation, and External Sources of Legislative Text, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1221, 1223,
1249 (2020); Thomas D. Haley, Data Protection in Disarray, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1235-36
(2020).
201. Hayes, supra note 200, at 1250-57.
202. Kosseff, supra note 196, at 1024-29 (describing the ways in which cybersecurity law
is inadequate).
203. See Solow-Niederman, supra note 12, at 618.
204. See id.; Meglio, supra note 190, at 1241.
205. Solove & Citron, supra note 198, at 737-38.
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Will McGeveran has suggested that existing law points toward a
quasi-fiduciary duty of firms, which he calls “data custodians,” to
provide data security to individuals who have data in their
charge.206
All of these proposals share an understanding that merely forcing companies to announce data breaches and subjecting them to
public actions from state attorneys general is insufficient to prevent
data insecurity. However, informational asymmetries create adverse
incentive structures that lead to widespread data insecurity. Data
breach notification laws rely on companies to report data breaches
to consumers and state authorities.207 Although these laws typically
define “data breach,” the company is left to make the initial determination as to whether a security incident requires public
disclosure.208 Such a regime presents the risk that companies may
conceal borderline security events that come close, but not quite, to
the level requiring disclosure. There is little incentive for firms to
take initiative to invest in data security beyond public law standards. This is because most private actions against parties for data
insecurity fail for lack of harm or lack of a case or controversy.209
The reputational harm from data insecurity exists, but the evidence
is mixed as to whether pure reputational harm influences the
behavior of firms.210
Private enforcement fills this incentive lacuna by encouraging
companies to protect consumer data even if it is possible to conceal
their security failures from the regulator.211 Imagine if failure to
provide adequate data security could be considered a tort (or failure
of some other legal obligation, perhaps in contract).212 Because
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) has become the norm,213 instead of
selling or licensing software, most companies simply pay to use
206. William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1139-40
(2019).
207. Hayes, supra note 200, at 1256.
208. Id. at 1252-55.
209. See Kosseff, supra note 196, at 1016.
210. See id. at 1016-17.
211. See Solow-Niederman, supra note 12, at 622 (discussing how a company’s incentives
change when framing privacy issues in a tort context).
212. See id. at 618.
213. See Samantha Schwartz, 2019 Trends: Cocktail of SaaS Applications Becomes the
Norm, CIO DIVE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.ciodive.com/news/2019-trends-cocktail-of-saasapplications-becomes-the-norm/544690/ [https://perma.cc/U97T-VQAU].
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software owned and hosted by another firm.214 In effect, SaaS concentrates responsibility for data security in a smaller number of
firms. One of the advantages of SaaS is that data security liability
can be contractually assigned to the SaaS provider.215 Because the
downstream firm (purchaser of SaaS) would face exposure to
liability if the data security practices of the upstream firm were
poor, the downstream firm would have the incentive to do due
diligence and acquire appropriate insurance.216 Having poor data
security practices, then, would cost the SaaS provider business.217
This would create an incentive to have strong data security
practices outside of and parallel to data breach notification public
law legislation. The private and public law avenues are mutually
reinforcing, but note the essential nature of the private right of
action.218 A private right of action creates an incentive for private
actors with more information and expertise about the relevant
technology to hold each other accountable without the need to disclose their practices to the public.
Tort law imposes strict liability to discourage reckless behavior
by forcing private actors to take every possible precaution.219 Strict
liability could be a powerful tool for preventing consumer exploitation from data leakage and data trafficking.220 There is a great deal
of precedent for this approach. The law imposes strict liability for
dangerous items with long-ranging implications in other areas of
the private law, including toxic torts221 and products liability.222
Databases pose predictable dangers to society, both when breached

214. Michael L. Rustad & Elif Kavusturan, A Commercial Law for Software Contracting,
76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 775, 778-79 (2019).
215. W. Kuan Hon, Christopher Millard & Ian Walden, Negotiating Cloud Contracts:
Looking at Clouds from Both Sides Now, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 79, 92-94 (2012) (empirical
study examining allocation of liability and risk in SaaS and other cloud contracts; found
strong relationship between allocation of risk and bargaining power).
216. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity with Cyberinsurance
Markets and Better Risk Assessment, 102 MINN. L. REV. 191, 193-94 (2017).
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Ormerod, supra note 12, at 1936.
220. See id. at 1936-38.
221. See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005);
Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 3d 826, 835 (E.D. Tenn. 2019).
222. See Roverano v. John Crane, Inc., 226 A.3d 526, 528, 536 (Pa. 2020).
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and when used as designed.223 Danielle Citron has compared
databases to reservoirs in the industrial age, arguing by analogy
that data security breaches should trigger strict liability.224 Peter
Ormerod has gone further, suggesting that any information misuse
violation also warrants strict liability.225 That is not just the result
of public legislation but also private law that keeps actors in society accountable to each other in order to preserve the dignity of the
individual in all aspects of her life.226 This shows the centrality of
private law in regulating privacy. Without strict liability for data
security harms, it is likely we will continue to see slipshod data
practices.227 Both the deterrence and dignitary justifications for private enforcement are present in motivating data security regulation.
On the one hand, overall deterrence of data security practices is the
aim of such regulation. But individuals can also face significant
personal harms from data insecurity, and should not feel powerless
to defend their personal information.
C. Data Power
Market power in the information age presents concerns that
antitrust law is not competent to address without support from
other forms of regulation.228 A series of articles has attacked the
status quo in the technology sector for promoting undue concentration of capabilities in the hands of a small group of companies.229
Controlling a large database of granular consumer data accords the
few owners of such databases powerful and unique abilities.230 These
capabilities are critical for the current day and even more important

223. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 12, at 244-45, 291-93.
224. See id. at 291-93.
225. See Ormerod, supra note 12, at 1936-38.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 1944-46.
228. See Orla Lynskey, Grappling with “Data Power”: Normative Nudges from Data
Protection and Privacy, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 189, 190, 194, 215 (2019); cf. Kristelia
A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 183,
246-47 (2016) (arguing for regulation that discourages industry cooperation and punishes lack
of competition in the technology space).
229. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1051, 1053-54 (2017).
230. See id. at 1083-89.
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for our future.231 Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning
are important resources and only look to become more important
with time.232 The basic tools for machine learning and AI are taught
to every computer science student at the college level.233 But
machine learning is only as strong as the size of its training set.234
Without access to the databases that the Big Five technology
companies control, there are limits to the quality of output even the
best coded machines can produce.235 Current methods of AI and
machine learning development rely on large banks of data.236
Therefore, the companies that have the most data will get the best
results and be able to develop higher quality AI and machine
learning applications and products.237 So the possession of data
creates dividends for entering new industries and will continue to
dominate in the future, unless the basic method by which AI and
machine learning changes.238
There are major economic implications of the combination of
influence and outsized ability to innovate that big players in the
information economy currently enjoy.239 Orla Lynskey argues that,
due to these specific characteristics, it is more useful to refer to data
231. See id. at 1083-89.
232. See C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of
Machine Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1978-81 (2019).
233. See generally Justin Aglio, An Inside Look—America’s First Public School AI Program,
GETTING SMART (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.gettingsmart.com/2019/01/04/an-inside-lookamericas-first-public-school-ai-program/ [https://perma.cc/CRF9-G3C2] (describing the AI and
machine learning program required for all Montour Public School District fifth through eighth
grade students).
234. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 677-81 (2017) (describing the need
for sufficient data to train a machine learning system).
235. See Hemphill, supra note 232, at 1978-81 (“Machine learning advances also reinforce
the importance of access to data. A larger stock of searches and observed outcomes—for
example, whether the user clicked—generates data needed to train and improve the
prediction of the algorithm. The importance of scale is heightened by the high variability of
user data.... Considered as a whole, advances in machine learning tend to reinforce the
market position of the leading platforms. There is reason to agree with the Economist’s
assessment, emphasizing various advantages of the incumbents: ‘It seems likely that the
incumbent tech groups will capture many of AI’s gains, given their wealth of data, computing
power, smart algorithms and human talent, not to mention a head start on investing.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Bamberger & Lobel, supra note 229, at 1083-87.
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power in this context rather than the more generic term “market
power.”240 I agree and will use the term throughout this Article.
Data power allows tech giants to act as gatekeepers in the information economy, empowering them to set norms for consumers
and policies for downstream companies.241 Even governments take
advantage of the influence of companies with data power to achieve
regulatory goals in the area of data protection.242 Business models
in the information economy are based on a “grow fast or die” model,
in contrast to the industrial age model of incremental growth.243
Modern startups aim to grow fast enough to attract the attention of
one of the larger companies in order to be purchased.244 Only in rare
hypergrowth situations do even successful companies become
worthy of continuing in their own right.245 A startup company that
looks to be able to profitably stand on its own even in the medium
run is “a unicorn”—a whimsical way to convey its extreme unlikelihood.246 Because few information-economy firms even hope or intend
to continue in perpetuity, maintaining relationships with companies
with more data power becomes critically important.247 A startup’s
prospects of seriously competing against the most data-powerful
companies are grim.248 If one has a useful and popular application
that would benefit from stronger AI, the current market incentivizes attempting to be acquired by Alphabet or Amazon rather than
trying to build from scratch the type of information mine those

240. See Lynskey, supra note 228, at 190, 194, 215.
241. See generally Bamberger & Lobel, supra note 229, at 1086 (“There may be wideranging ways that Uber and other two-sided platforms can abuse their market power by
taking advantage of the massive data they collect, to the detriment of both sides of the
market.... By means of this information asymmetry, [Uber] can leverage ‘access to information
about users and their control over the user experience to mislead, coerce, or otherwise disadvantage sharing economy participants.’”).
242. See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA.
L. REV. 467, 469-72, 475-77 (2020).
243. See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and
the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1626-27, 1650 (2018).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Salvador Rodriguez, The Real Reason Everyone Calls Billion-Dollar Startups
‘Unicorns,’ INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015, 12:25 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/real-reasoneveryone-calls-billion-dollar-startups-unicorns-2079596 [https://perma.cc/VS6X-3F9K].
247. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5.
248. See id.
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companies already have.249 This type of incentive explains why the
United States acknowledges many utilities as “natural” monopolies
and regulates these monopolies accordingly.250 It simply does not
make any economic sense for multiple companies to run powerlines
through the same community—it is more efficient to pool resources.
Because of this similarity, some argue that a similar regime may be
needed for companies with major data power.251
As the Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrates,252 the rise of the
platform economy means that the influence of data power goes beyond the mere exercise of power of the actor with data power.253 If
another company can leverage or siphon off the abilities of the
monopolist, negative outcomes could arise outside the interests of
the actor with market power itself.254 The existence of data power,
then, creates a certain type of threat because once it is there, it can
be leveraged by anyone who gains access to it.255 If antitrust law
does not lead to the breakup of companies with data power—and
even if it does—data power may have many of the characteristics of
249. See John Mannes, Facebook, Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft Come Together to
Create the Partnership on AI, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 28, 2016, 5:01 PM), https://techcrunch.com/
2016/09/28/facebook-amazon-google-ibm-and-microsoft-come-together-to-create-historicpartnership-on-ai/ [https://perma.cc/AS9N-2T9R].
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Rahman, supra note 243, at 1637 (“Industries triggered public utility
regulation when there was a combination of economies of scale limiting ordinary
accountability through market competition and a moral or social importance that made the
industries too vital to be left to the whims of the market or the control of a handful of private
actors. This combination of economic dominance and social necessity is what created the
threat of not just exploitative prices but also discrimination and unequal access.”); Adam
Candeub, The Common Carrier Privacy Model, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 809, 846-47 (2018)
(arguing for imposing common carrier liability on internet companies to protect privacy).
252. See, e.g., Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million
Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridgeanalytica-facebook-influence-us-election [https://perma.cc/7LY7-EYX5] (detailing how
Cambridge Analytica built an algorithm to determine voting behavior by harvesting data from
more than fifty million Facebook profiles through an online personality test that collected
information on test-takers’ Facebook friends).
253. See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89-90 (2016).
254. See generally Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, supra note 252 (describing how
Cambridge Analytica exploited access to Facebook profiles and networks and used the
collected data for political and financial gain).
255. See, e.g., id. (“[Cambridge Analytica] exploited Facebook to harvest millions of people’s
profiles. And built models to exploit what [Cambridge Analytica] knew about them and target
their inner demons. That was the basis the entire company was built on.”).
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public utilities and should be regulated more like utilities and
utility-like industries.256 That is, legislators should not hesitate to
provide specific rules that companies with data power must apply
in order to serve the public interest, much like they do with banks,
utilities, and other industries with major concentration that citizens
must use to survive.
Data power, like other forms of market power, is a strange beast
because it is not inherently bad to have just one provider of a given
service, or just one actor in control of a resource.257 Problems arise
because the monopolist, given that no other actor is in a position to
stop her, can take advantage of her position by offering higher
prices or lower-quality goods.258 Also, absent the threat of competition, a monopolist lacks the incentive to innovate and provide better
services.259 Instead, the monopolist is more inclined to expend
resources suppressing and acquiring competition.260 After the Gilded
Age highlighted the dangers of an economy dominated by companies
with market power, Congress enacted antitrust laws to protect
consumers from exploitation and to provide would-be competitors an
opportunity to compete.261
Several authors pointedly compare the rise of technology companies with data power over the past two decades to the Gilded Age,
dubbing it the New Gilded Age.262 And indeed, one can observe both
negative characteristics described above in the current operating of
major information-economy firms.263 Consider the data protection
256. See Rahman, supra note 243, at 1650.
257. Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2263-64 (2013).
258. Id. at 2265.
259. See id. at 2271.
260. See id. at 2262.
261. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 45-58 (2018);
see also Orbach, supra note 257, at 2262 (“The members of Congress undoubtedly intended
to address the ‘trust problem,’ but their lack of direct discussion of the merits of competition
is puzzling.”).
262. See generally Tom Wheeler, Who Makes the Rules in the New Gilded Age?: Lessons
from the Industrial Age Inform the Information Age, BROOKINGS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.
brookings.edu/research/who-makes-the-rules-in-the-new-gilded-age/ [https://perma.cc/GH2VVHZD] (“Today we live in the new Gilded Age: technology-driven innovations have again
improved daily life while creating great wealth, inequality of circumstances, non-competitive
markets, and viral deceit.”).
263. Compare Maurice E. Stucke, Here Are All the Reasons It’s a Bad Idea to Let a Few
Tech Companies Monopolize Our Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://hbr.org/
2018/03/here-are-all-the-reasons-its-a-bad-idea-to-let-a-few-tech-companies-monopolize-our-
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policy of the Big Five’s email and messaging services.264 There is no
option to refuse to have your data processed or shared with partner
companies.265 While some argue that consumers love getting free
services and accept the “cost” of invasive data practices,266 that
argument presumes a free market.267 If we presume market power,
there is another, market-power-oriented reason for the availability
of information services that do not provide much data protection.268
When the price stays the same (free), offering a lower-quality
product is the equivalent of charging a higher price than the free
market would offer.269 It is the ability of the actor with market
power to demand more of the public than a free market would
permit.270 Secondly, we also see the Big Five working to buy their
competition.271 Absorption is one way of holding true competition
and innovation in check. What is more, some observers note that the
rate of actual change in experience presented by technology has
slowed over the past ten to fifteen years relative to the 1990s and
early 2000s.272 This coincides with the rise of a set of firms with
serious data power.273
data [https://perma.cc/GAH9-KJQY], with supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
264. See Alex Hern, Privacy Policies of Tech Giants ‘Still Not GDPR-Compliant,’ THE
GUARDIAN (July 4, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/05/
privacy-policies-facebook-amazon-google-not-gdpr-compliant [https://perma.cc/ND59-RSPX].
265. See id.
266. Cf., e.g., Ellis Hamburger, Consumers Pay the Hidden Costs for the ‘Free’ App
Ecosystem, THE VERGE (Jan. 7, 2013, 9:31 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/1/7/3835724/
the-price-of-apps [https://perma.cc/H5C7-Q3FP].
267. Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, Giving Away Our Data for Free Is a Market
Failure, PROMARKET (Feb. 1, 2021), https://promarket.org/2021/02/01/free-data-marketfailure-digital-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/63GL-WZAB].
268. See id.
269. See Hamburger, supra note 266.
270. See Economides & Lianos, supra note 267 (“[W]e observe a market failure where all
transactions occur at the same zero price, and some transactions that would have occurred
under competition do not occur. The market failure is a direct result of the imposition of the
take-it-or-leave-it contract by dominant digital platforms and the default opt-in.”).
271. See Gerrit De Vynck & Cat Zakrzewski, Tech Giants Quietly Buy up Dozens of
Companies a Year. Regulators Are Finally Noticing., WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2021, 7:59 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/20/secret-tech-acquisitions-ftc/
[https://perma.cc/68Z4-DWX6].
272. See id.
273. See generally Economides & Lianos, supra note 267 (crediting mergers between
smaller companies and large “voracious[ ] collect[ors of] personal information” like Google and
Facebook and the resulting market dominance of the Big Five as a primary driver of “[t]he
ability of the digital platforms to drive users to accept their take-it-or-leave-it opt-in contract
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Antitrust law is a hybrid enforcement regime, including a private
right of action for parties impacted by unfair competition, providing
for treble damages for successful cases in order to enhance deterrence.274 The Supreme Court has specifically noted the significance
of deterrence in the reason for this measurement of relief.275 A 2008
empirical study of forty cases showed that private enforcement was
a key source of deterrence for anticompetitive behavior, noting:
“almost half of the underlying violations were first uncovered by
private attorneys, not government enforcers, and that litigation in
many other cases had a mixed public/private origin.”276 The authors
concluded that private enforcement likely does more to deter anticompetitive conduct than public enforcement.
As of the early 2000s, the Supreme Court has sought to limit
private enforcement in antitrust law.277 Notably, in 2004, in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, the Court
worried about the cost of false positives in antitrust litigation, and
the dangers of potential “chilling effects” to industry.278 The increasing concentration of the technology industry counsels reconsideration of this skepticism of private enforcement in antitrust.
Privacy is among the key dignitary concerns that commentators flag

to provide personal data at zero price”).
274. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 305 (2022) (“Congress has
encouraged private antitrust litigation not merely to compensate those who have been directly
injured, but also to vindicate the important public interest in free competition. The Clayton
Act functions as the private enforcement mechanism for claims brought under the federal
antitrust laws. The Act generally allows private persons to sue for treble damages or
injunctive relief. Such injunctive relief may include divestiture. The availability of a private
antitrust action, and its accompanying treble-damages remedy, serves both to compensate
private persons for their injuries and to punish wrongdoers. Private enforcement of the
nation’s antitrust laws also increases the likelihood that violators will be discovered.”
(footnotes omitted)).
275. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969)
(“[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not
merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the
antitrust laws.”); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. N.J. Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965) ( “Congress has expressed its belief that private antitrust litigation is one of the surest
weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.”).
276. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U. S.F. L. REV. 879, 880 (2008).
277. Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American
Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 636 (2010).
278. 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004).

2022]

PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION IN PRIVACY LAW

1685

when concerns are raised about data power.279 While deterrence is
traditionally preeminent in rationales for private antitrust enforcement, compensation and retribution for other firms effected are a
powerful alternate rationale for private enforcement of antitrust.280
Nicholas Cornell has recently articulated a justification for private
enforcement of antitrust as a “form of accountability between
parties,” showing how public regulatory law can give rise to “private
moral grievances.”281
D. Digital Market Manipulation
Digital market manipulation is using personal information to
unilaterally determine citizens’ preferences and behaviors.282 Ryan
Calo showed that digital market manipulation substantively differs
from pre-information age forms of persuasion in three ways: (1) “‘the
mass production of bias’ through big data,” (2) “the possibility of far
greater consumer intelligence through ‘disclosure ratcheting,’” and
(3) “the move from ends-based to means-based ad targeting and
interface design.”283 Advanced methods called “dark patterns” intensify the ability of applications designed to manipulate consumers.284
“Dark patterns are user interface design choices that benefit an
online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving users into making
unintended and potentially harmful decisions.”285 Brett Frischmann
279. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer
Protection, and the Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 132 (2015); Stucke,
supra note 263.
280. See generally Sanjukta Paul, Recovering the Moral Economy Foundations of the Sherman Act, 131 YALE L.J. 175, 179 (2021).
281. Nicolas Cornell, Competition Wrongs, 129 YALE L.J. 2030, 2037 (2020).
282. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2014);
Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449 (2019).
283. Calo, supra note 282, at 1006-07.
284. See Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 43-44 (2021) (“[The article] discusses the results of the authors’ two largescale experiments in which representative samples of American consumers were exposed to
dark patterns.... [Based on their findings, the authors concluded] [m]any dark patterns appear
to violate federal and state laws restricting the use of unfair and deceptive practices in
trade.”).
285. Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan
Mayer, Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl
of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, at 81:1,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07032.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CW7-8FEU].
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and Evan Selinger describe the extensive intervention in consumer
behavior as inducing humans to behave like “simple machines,”
without the people so shaped even realizing it.286 The most famous
instance of this is the Cambridge Analytica scandal of 2017.287 The
ability of private elites to influence citizen opinions is not new and
may be inevitable to some degree.288 Yet there are concerns that the
granular degree of control companies have over what individuals see
and experience could enable an unprecedented degree of effective
mind control with the potential to undermine democracy.289
Private enforcement enables individuals to wield the law when
they determine that their legal rights have been violated.290 Public
enforcement is removed from the lived relationship between parties
in society.291 The adversarial nature of the American justice system
allows for the ongoing analysis and evolution of the nature and
character of violation of the rights and responsibilities members of
society have against one another.292
These procedural inputs are of fundamental importance in the
case of digital market manipulation. Unlike, for example, salesmanship versus fraud, there is not a common cultural baseline that

286. BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 6 (2018).
287. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Governance of the Facebook Privacy Crisis, 20 PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 43, 97, 99, 125 (2020); see also supra notes 251-54.
288. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 263 (1944) (“The only
point that matters here is that, Human Nature in Politics being what it is, [leaders] are able
to fashion and, within very wide limits, even to create the will of the people. What we are
confronted with in the analysis of political processes is largely not a genuine but a
manufactured will. And often this artefact is all that in reality corresponds to the volonté
générale of the classical doctrine. So far as this is so, the will of the people is the product and
not the motive power of the political process.”); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Excerpt from
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), in THE IDEA OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A READER
54 (Jostein Gripsrud et al. eds., 2010) (“Schumpeter’s interest in mass society and crowd
psychology ... led him to underline influence of advertising and other methods of persuasion.
He regarded it as evident that ‘the will of the people’ could be fabricated or manufactured by
the rulers and that a genuine public participation in politics therefore was an illusion. The
public sphere in Schumpeter’s approach is reduced to a market and a competitive arena for
elite groups.”).
289. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 286, at 6.
290. LAHAV, supra note 107, at 32, 39.
291. See id. at 39 (“American society values decentralization and individualized
enforcement of the law as opposed to enforcement through a bureaucracy engaged in
centralized decision-making. Private litigation reflects these values.”).
292. See id. at 32, 39.
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allows individuals to intuitively understand the difference between
digital market manipulation and puffery.293
The limit of public enforcement in the case of techno-social engineering comes from several characteristics of the administrative
state. The extent to which government can understand social norms
without the facts and context presented in cases between individuals is limited.294 As many technological applications are developed
outside of government, private individuals and firms will often have
a superior understanding of the first-level functionings of the technology and the second-order social workings of that technology.295
An example of these two levels can be found in the workings of the
popular social media platform Twitter. Twitter has a variety of
complicated coding and moderation characteristics mostly unavailable to the public; these characteristics represent the first-level
technical functionings that may be difficult for government actors
to understand.296 Customers’ practical use of the application comprises the second-order social level. The Twitter search function
using “hash” emerged organically among users, not from the central
programming of the app.297
As long as the boundaries of digital market manipulation are in
flux, companies that control platforms can, to the extent possible,
shield themselves from direct regulation and government scrutiny.298 Such companies have an incentive to prevent the development of disadvantageous rules. While some writers have shown
optimism about the command and control structure in digital

293. Cf. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (defining
the term “grok” as a synonym for understanding intuitively, discussing its use in a techlaw
context).
294. See Kerry, supra note 142.
295. See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 369, 370, 386-87 (2016).
296. See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 113, at 701-02; Joyce E. Cutler, Lawmakers’
Lack of Technical Expertise Worries ABA Science, Technology Leaders, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar.
15, 2012), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/e-discovery-and-legal-tech/lawmakers-lack-oftechnical-expertise-worries-aba-science-technology-leaders [https://perma.cc/RB5U-GSJS].
297. Lexi Pandell, An Oral History of the #Hashtag, WIRED (May 19, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/oral-history-hashtag/ [https://perma.cc/S8EK-TNYS]
(describing the hashtag as starting from “early adopters ... developing tools to organize their
tweets”).
298. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 547, 554-55
(2016).
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regulation,299 effective digital regulation requires a real-world
understanding of social-technical practices. Although adversarial
litigation and arbitration do not perfectly simulate the features of
new norms and technologies, public regulation relies substantially
on material produced by interest groups, which is hardly more
objective.300 Government does not have a seat at the table in day-today development of technology and social practices, and the organic
disputes that arise therefrom.301 Thus, without the support of private enforcement, the government’s direct understanding of and
stake in such disputes is limited.302
Digital market manipulation puts the average citizen at the
mercy of internet commerce companies, and subjects the citizen to
arbitrary power by the platform owner.303 Private enforcement
would give the citizen some right of private action against the
company for interfering with her self-determination and exposing
her privacy invasions and data insecurity. This right could take the
form of increased tort liability that cannot be disclaimed, implied
contractual obligations that cannot be disclaimed, or some form of
fiduciary duty owed by the company to the consumer.
Digital market manipulation could lead to major economic losses
to individuals. According private rights of action to pursue them
would provide an additional incentive to companies to avoid manipulative conduct, even when state regulatory bodies are overwhelmed
or inactive. Furthermore, when a citizen feels wronged by a company’s manipulative practice, according them the right to pursue
their own claims, even if public regulatory bodies are disinterested
in doing so, accords dignity to the citizen while pragmatically giving
her the opportunity to seek relief when she has been wronged.
Overall, discouraging manipulation in markets encourages markets
based on actual consumer preferences rather than smoke and
mirrors, which is better for society overall, as well as the progress
of innovation.

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1274 (2017).
See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 298, at 551-52.
See Cutler, supra note 296.
See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 298, at 592-93.
See id. at 550-51.
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E. Government Surveillance
Government surveillance refers to the increased ability of government to surveil citizens.304 The classic rule of law formulation
states that citizens have a right to be free of arbitrary exercise of
power.305 Yet, the government’s increasing access to personal information could effectively enable government to influence and control
citizens.306 Even commentators less worried about private-sector
manipulation have expressed concerns about government wielding
unchecked access to personal information about every citizen.307 For
example, following a deadly terrorist attack in 2015, the Department of Justice sought access to a suspect’s encrypted iPhone.308
Apple, a public company with direct relationships with consumers,
bristled at the reputational harm from publicly turning over
customers’ information to the government.309 Cases such as this
highlight the intertwined relationship between private corporations
and the government. As long as private actors have information or
relationships that could be useful to the government, the government will pressure those private actors to share that information.310
Even powerful companies such as Apple have an incentive to
cooperate with government investigations and informal agency
oversight to avoid backlash in the form of unfavorable legislative or
policy decisions.311 Ultimately, no private actor can match the
304. See Jonathan Vanian, How Digital Surveillance Thrived in the 20 Years Since 9/11,
FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2021, 5:15 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/09/08/digital-privacy-patriot-act-911/ [https://perma.cc/P3XF-UUB4].
305. Cf. Robert A. Stein, What Exactly Is the Rule of Law?, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 185, 187-89
(2019).
306. See Stucke, supra note 263.
307. E.g., Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence
of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 975, 1003
(1999).
308. Julia P. Eckart, The Department of Justice Versus Apple Inc.—the Great Encryption
Debate Between Privacy and National Security, 27 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4-6 (2019)
(describing the history and implications of the dispute between Apple and the DOJ following
the San Bernadino shooting).
309. Id. at 41.
310. See Stucke, supra note 263.
311. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 333 (2002) (“Political
choice theory teaches that regulatory schemes are influenced by political actors and interest
groups, making it difficult to predict the underlying goals ex ante. Even if there are clear
normative goals at the outset, the political process may lead to other goals. Some regulatory
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government’s power; this asymmetry is by design. The fundamental
purpose of government involves bringing all nongovernment actors
under the state’s control—at least to some degree.312
Though the Fourth Amendment limits the government’s ability
to perform searches and seizures, in many cases, the third party
disclosure rule allows the government to access indirectly what it
cannot directly.313 Even assuming arguendo that reputation serves
as a check against private-sector privacy abuses, such a check does
not apply to the federal government’s potential privacy violations.
This is because, as the Snowden disclosures revealed, many of the
court determinations permitting federal access to personal information data are—by design—not public.314 However, many of the most
significant data traffickers with broad-based information about
every American are not even public-facing entities in direct contract
with consumers, so they also do not face reputational concerns.315 A
handful of magistrate judges, keenly worried about the potential
impropriety of the government accessing too much information,
have erected somewhat higher standards for government access to
privately held information.316
When it comes to privacy and data security threats, private and
public actors are a two-headed monster. One inevitably feeds the
schemes thus will favor efficiency goals, some may favor distributional and other nonefficiency goals, and some may combine these goals. One cannot always assume that efficiency
is the sole goal of commercial regulation.” (footnotes omitted)).
312. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI., 94, 101-02 (2008); E.A. Goerner & Walter J. Thompson, Politics and Coercion, 24
POL. THEORY 620, 621 (1996); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 106 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed.,
Oxford World Classics 1996) (“These dictates of reason, men used to call by the name of laws;
but improperly: for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to the
conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly is the word of him, that by
right hath command over others.”). But see Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 669 (considering the
idea of powerful technology companies as politically neutral peers of traditional governments).
313. See Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2017).
314. Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679,
1683-85 (2015); see also Jonathan Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803, 806 (2018).
315. See Scholz, supra note 84, at 663-64.
316. See generally Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the
“Magistrates’ Revolt,” 68 EMORY L.J. 49, 53 (2018) (describing the “outsized effect” of judicial
limitations placed on government access of personal information during the so-called
Magistrates’ Revolt, including requiring the government to disclose the intended duration of
the data seizure and its plan for any information that may be recovered outside of the
intended basis for the application, to obtain a warrant).
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other, and both are inextricably linked, because under the thirdparty doctrine, government agencies can usually demand access to
most information a company has.317 Modern practices have it that
third parties collectively hold most information about the average
person. So in order to truly eradicate a certain type of privacy risk
to citizens, a comprehensive approach—incorporating both public
and private enforcement—is required. The laws governing private
actors’ informational transactions necessarily shape and limit the
government’s reach, because the government can obtain data from
private parties that it could not legally access directly.318 Much of
this transfer can even happen outside of the formal channels of
warrant acquisition.319 The only real way to prevent the government
from acquiring a certain type of information is to limit private
actors’ ability to acquire such information, or to put certain limitations on their acquisition, such as data minimization policy.
The possibility that public actors may access private actors’ data
stockpiles is one of several reasons why private parties should not
possess powers that threaten the rule of law.320 If our goal is to
prevent the state from accessing certain data sources, private
enforcement must inhibit the compilation of such data.321 Otherwise,
public law alone cannot prevent the state from exercising the same
powers that animate rule of law concerns when the government acts
or acquires directly.322 Private enforcement claims that discourage
“collect-it-all” databases would also limit the government’s ability
to be parasitic on those databases.323 Examples of potential private
rights of action include a negligence action against a provider whose
policies insufficiently protected user data, or a breach of the implied
duty of good faith if appropriate representations about data security
were made between two contracting parties.324 Several
317. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979). The third-party doctrine has been criticized as a state intrusion on individual
privacy. E.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
318. Richards, supra note 313, at 1444.
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Kerry, supra note 142.
322. See Stein, supra note 305, at 187-89; Stucke, supra note 263.
323. See, e.g., Kerry, supra note 142.
324. See, e.g., Solow-Niederman, supra note 12, at 619-22.
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commentators have suggested novel tort private rights of actions
against actors with poor data security practices.325
Limiting private actors’ ability to exert arbitrary power directly
on consumers also prevents the government’s ability to exert arbitrary power indirectly through private actors.326 Limiting a private
company’s ability to exert arbitrary power not only prevents that
company from exploiting consumers directly but also prevents the
government from exploiting consumers through companies.
CONCLUSION
Private rights of action have a critical role to play in privacy
regulation. If legislators and stakeholders want privacy laws to
make a difference, private enforcement of privacy rights is imperative. Privacy laws will lack effectiveness without private litigants
adding accountability through public pressure and additional enforcement. Private rights of action are a fixture in regulating many
complex and pervasive areas of life and commerce, and indeed have
been included in several of the most effective federal privacy laws.
The importance, complexity, and prevalence of privacy issues in society makes hybrid enforcement necessary for resilient privacy
regulation.
In addition to increasing the effectiveness of the law, private
rights of action make the content of the law more responsive to
social and technological realities by allowing judicial decisions to
develop nuance in the application of legislation. Pleadings, motion
practice, and discovery allow the deliberative, public processing of
information about privacy practices and encourages a public conversation about and processing of privacy norms.
Finally, private enforcement honors the common law roots of
privacy in the United States. In their influential article that was the
first to describe the right to privacy in American law, Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren characterized privacy as a dignitary
right possessed by each person in their personality, which flowed
directly from our common law tradition.327 It would be wrong to
325. Ormerod, supra note 12, at 1896, 1919; Ludington, supra note 12, at 146.
326. See Stucke, supra note 263.
327. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
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deny an individual the power to enforce such a bedrock right simply
because a public agency declined to enforce it. The concept of
privacy, taken seriously, should allow individuals the opportunity
to contest privacy wrongs through legal process. The question of
whether to make a claim based on a dignitary right in one’s personality should not come down to an agency’s decision. According
individuals the power to vindicate their privacy rights would be an
important step towards creating an information society that recognizes and values citizens.
Concerns about private enforcement leading to too much deterrence should be addressed in light of these two independent justifications for private enforcement. Such concerns may lead
lawmakers to offer limited private enforcement or limit relief. But
the drastic act of providing no private enforcement avenue at all for
new privacy laws has the potential to doom their success from the
start.

